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Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative
elections. In the model, districting matters because it determines the seat-vote curve, which describes the
relationship between seats and votes. The paper ￿rst characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve, and shows
that, under a weak condition, there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship. The paper then
develops an empirical methodology for computing seat-vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from
implementing optimal districting. This is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S. state
legislators during the 1990s.
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at NYU, UC Berkeley, Princeton, Rutgers, Stanford, Yale, Stockholm University, the 2006 NBER fall public
economics meetings, and the 2005 PIER conference on political economy. We thank the National Science Foundation
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The decennial redrawing of district lines used in electing candidates to federal, state, and local
legislatures in the United States has generated intense interest among voters, politicians, and
parties alike. The intensity of this interest in redistricting, as witnessed through both political and
legal battles, should come as no surprise. Districting is a critical determinant of the representation
of parties in legislatures. To illustrate, consider a legislature with 10 seats and suppose that 50%
of the population always vote Democrat and 50% always vote Republicans. Then, while the
\unbiased" seat share for the Democrats is 5, the actual share can vary from 1 to 9 depending
upon the districting. For example, the Democrats can get 9 seats by creating 9 districts that
contain 51% Democrat voters.
The public interest in redistricting has given rise to a large empirical literature in political
science analyzing redistricting plans and the redistricting process.1 In this literature, redistricting
plans are typically characterized by the implied relationship between seats in the legislature and
support for parties among voters. In particular, the seat-vote curve relates the fraction of seats
won by (say) the Democratic Party to their support among voters across all districts. Formally,
the seat-vote curve is a function S(V ) where V is the aggregate fraction of votes received by the
Democrats and S is the fraction of seats in the legislature that they hold. The key properties of
a seat-vote curve are its partisan bias and responsiveness. Partisan bias - de￿ned most simply as
S(1=2) ￿ 1=2 - measures how the districting advantages one or the other party.2 Responsiveness
- de￿ned as ￿S=￿V - measures how the composition of the legislature changes in response to
changes in citizens’ voting behavior. Researchers have developed statistical methods to estimate
seat-vote curves and to measure the associated responsiveness and partisan bias parameters. Basic
questions are then how responsiveness and bias are altered following the redrawing of district lines
and also how di￿erent institutional arrangements for redistricting in￿uence these changes.
While this literature is certainly very interesting from a positive perspective, the normative
lessons to be drawn from it are unclear. Is partisan bias necessarily a bad thing from the per-
spective of voters? What is the optimal degree of responsiveness? More generally, how should
voters be allocated across districts? Furthermore, how do the districting schemes that are used
in practice compare with optimal schemes and what would be the welfare gains from optimal
districting? Our purpose in this paper is to explore these questions.
1We begin by developing a simple micro-founded model of legislative elections that provides a
framework for investigating the districting problem which is consonant with the existing literature.
There are three types of voters: Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Democrats and Re-
publicans have ￿xed ideologies, while Independents’ are swing voters whose ideologies vary across
elections. There are two political parties, one representing Democrats and the other Republicans.
These parties ￿eld candidates in each district and the candidates with the most votes are elected
to the legislature. Citizens care about the ideological make-up of the legislature which in turn
depends upon the share of seats each party holds. The allocation of voter types across districts
determines the seat-vote curve; i.e., the relationship between the Democratic seat share and their
aggregate vote share.
In the context of this model, we analyze the problem of a districting authority who seeks to
maximize expected social welfare. We assume that the authority can observe citizens’ types (i.e.,
whether they are Democrats, Republicans, or Independents) and we abstract from geographical
constraints in the ability to craft districts. We approach the problem by characterizing the optimal
seat-vote curve, which describes the ideal relationship between seats and votes. We then develop
a condition under which the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in the sense that there exist
districtings that generate this optimal relationship between seats and votes. These underlying
districtings are socially optimal districtings, and we describe their composition.
We then use the model to develop an empirical methodology for assessing how actual districting
plans compare with optimal plans and for computing the welfare gains from implementing optimal
districting. This methodology has four distinct components: (i) a method for estimating actual
seat-vote curves, (ii) a method for computing optimal seat-vote curves, (iii) a way of checking the
condition for implementability and, (iv) a way of estimating the welfare gains from implementing
optimal seat vote curves. Finally, we apply this methodology to analyze the districting plans
used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s. We estimate actual and optimal seat-vote
curves, check the condition for implementability, and then compute the welfare gains from optimal
districting. We also compare actual and optimal seat-vote curves with those that would emerge
under a system of proportional representation or with at-large elections.
Despite its importance, the problem of optimal districting has attracted scant attention.3 The
bulk of existing theoretical work on districting focuses on the partisan gerrymandering problem:
that is, how to craft political districts with the aim of maximizing a party’s expected seat share.4
2The motivation is the purely positive one of shedding light on how partisan redistricting commit-
tees might further their political objectives.5 The few normative papers that have been written
work with very di￿erent underlying political models and objective functions than used in this
paper. In work done independently, Gilligan and Matsusaka [2005] look at the optimal district-
ing problem from a median voter perspective. In Downsian fashion, they assume that candidates
adopt the ideology of the median voter in their districts and that policy outcomes depend upon the
ideology of the median legislator. Their social objective is thus to minimize the distance between
the median legislator’s ideology and the median voter’s ideology. Epstein and O’Hallaran [2004]
focus on the racial gerrymandering problem, under which the planner attempts to maximize the
welfare of minority groups.6 More generally, we are not aware of either any normative work on
districting that is consistent with the seat-vote curve approach of the empirical literature or any
work that evaluates the gains from optimal districting empirically.7
Our paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of seat-vote curves. Our key point
of departure from this literature is the development of a micro-founded model that guides our
empirical methodology. The only other work we are aware of that explores the micro foundations
of seat-vote curves is the independent work of Besley and Preston [2006]. These authors are
interested in understanding how districting impacts the strategic platform choices of political
parties. They develop a similar micro-founded model that generates an equilibrium relationship
between seats and votes. Their main theoretical point is to show that the partisan bias of the
seat-vote curve is a key determinant of parties’ electoral incentives to be responsive to swing
voters with respect to their platform choices. They provide empirical evidence in favor of their
theory by showing that local government policy choice in the United Kingdom is related to the
parameters of the local seat-vote curve in the way the theory predicts. Their work therefore
identi￿es a theoretical mechanism by which the form of the seat-vote curve (and hence districting)
matters for citizens’ welfare and provides evidence for this. By contrast, our model, which assumes
￿xed party ideologies, re￿ects the conventional view that districting matters because it determines
which party gets the most seats and hence the ideological composition of the legislature.
More generally, our paper contributes to the growing literature applying contemporary polit-
ical economy modelling and welfare economic methods to explore the optimal design of political
institutions. This literature includes e￿orts to understand the relative merits of di￿erent electoral
systems (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico [2001] and Myerson [1999]); systems of campaign ￿nance (e.g.,
3Coate [2004] and Prat [2002]); and methods of choosing policy-makers (e.g., Maskin and Tirole
[2004]). It also includes analyses of the desirability of citizens’ initiatives (e.g., Matsusaka and
McCarty [2001]); the optimal allocation of functions across layers of government (e.g., Lockwood
[2002]); and the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems (e.g., Persson, Roland
and Tabellini [2000]). The districting problem is somewhat di￿erent from these constitutional
design questions in that it must be done on an on-going basis in any political system with geo-
graphically based districts. This makes the problem particularly salient.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the model, describes the optimal districting
problem, and explains how we tackle it. Section III presents the key theoretical results. Section
IV develops our empirical methodology and Section V applies this methodology to U.S. state
legislative elections. Section VI concludes with a summary of the main results of the analysis.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a state in which there are three types of voters - Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents. Voters di￿er in their political ideologies which are measured on a 0 to 1 scale.
Democrats and Republicans have ideologies 0 and 1, respectively. Independents have ideologies
that are uniformly distributed on the interval [m￿￿;m+￿] where ￿ > 0. These voters are \swing
voters" and so the ideology of the median Independent may vary across elections. Speci￿cally,
m is the realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [1=2 ￿ ";1=2 + "], where " 2
(0;￿) and " + ￿ ￿ 1=2: The latter assumption guarantees that Independents are always between
Democrats and Republicans, while the former guarantees that some Independents lean Democrat
and some lean Republican. The fractions of voters statewide who are Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents are, respectively, ￿D, ￿R and ￿I.
Policy choices in the state are determined by an n-seat legislature. Legislators’ policy choices
are in￿uenced by their ideologies and, hence, citizens care about the ideological make up of their
legislature. Speci￿cally, if the average ideology of the legislature is x0, a citizen with ideology x
experiences a quadratic payo￿ given by ￿ ￿ ￿(x ￿ x0)2. The parameter ￿ is the surplus a citizen
would obtain from having a legislature that is perfectly congruent with his own ideology and the
parameter ￿ measures the rate at which this surplus is dissipated as the ideology of the legislature
diverges from that of the citizen. The ratio ￿=￿ will play an important role in the welfare analysis
and can be interpreted as the fraction of the surplus a partisan (i.e., a Democrat or Republican)
4obtains from having a perfectly congruent legislature that is dissipated by having a legislature
composed entirely of the opposing ideology. This ratio is assumed to be bounded between zero
and one (￿=￿ 2 [0;1]).8
There are two political parties in the state: the Democrats and the Republicans. These
parties are made up of collections of citizens who share the same political ideology, so that the
membership of the Democrat Party are Democrats and the membership of the Republican Party
are Republicans. Legislators are all a￿liated with one or the other party.
To select legislators, the state is divided into n equally-sized (in terms of population) political
districts indexed by i 2 f1=n;2=n;:::;1g. Each district then elects a representative to the legis-
lature. Candidates are put forward by the two political parties. Following the citizen-candidate
approach (Besley and Coate [1997] and Osborne and Slivinski [1996]), there is no commitment so
that candidates cannot credibly promise to run on an ideology di￿erent from their true ideology.
Accordingly, Democratic candidates are associated with the ideology 0 and Republican candidates
with the ideology 1. Elections are held simultaneously in each of the n districts and the candidate
with the most votes wins. In each district, every citizen votes sincerely for the representative
whose ideology is closest to his own.
II.A. Districtings
A districting is a division of the population into n districts. Formally, a districting is described
by (￿D(i);￿I(i);￿R(i))1
i=1=n where ￿D(i) represents the fraction of Democrats in district i, ￿R(i)
the fraction of Republicans, and ￿I(i) the fraction of Independents. The districting is chosen
by a districting authority that knows the group membership of citizens and faces no geographic
constraints in terms of how it can group citizens. Thus, any districting (￿D(i);￿I(i);￿R(i))1
i=1=n
such that the average fractions of voter types equal the actual is feasible. Let ￿ denote the set of
feasible districtings and, to simplify notation, let ￿ 2 ￿ denote a generic feasible districting.
II.B. Seat-vote Curves
Any feasible districting ￿ = (￿D(i);￿I(i);￿R(i))1
i=1=n implies a relationship between the De-
mocratic seat share in the legislature and their statewide vote share. Note ￿rst that if the median
independent has ideology m, the fraction of voters in district i voting for the Democrat candidate
is
V (i;m) = ￿D(i) + ￿I(i)[
1=2 ￿ (m ￿ ￿)
2￿
]: (1)
5This group consists of all the Democrats and those Independents whose ideologies are less than
1=2. The statewide vote share of the Democrat Party is therefore
V (m) = ￿D + ￿I[
1=2 ￿ (m ￿ ￿)
2￿
]: (2)
Let V and V denote, respectively, the maximum and minimum statewide Democrat vote shares;
i.e., V = V (1=2 ￿ ") and V = V (1=2 + ").
Now, for any feasible statewide vote share V 2 [V ;V ], let m(V ) denote the ideology of the






￿I + 2￿D ￿ 2V
￿I
]. (3)
Substituting this into (1), we obtain




District i elects a Democrat if V (i;m(V )) ￿ 1=2; or, equivalently, if




where V ￿(i) is the critical statewide vote threshold above which district i elects a Democrat.
District i is a safe Democrat (safe Republican) seat if V ￿(i) ￿ V (V ￿(i) ￿ V ). A seat which is not
safe is competitive.
Without loss of generality, order the districts so that V ￿(1=n) ￿ V ￿(2=n) ￿ :::: ￿ V ￿(1): Then,
the fraction of seats the Democrats receive when they have vote share V is
S(V j￿) = maxfi : V ￿(i) ￿ V g: (6)
This is the seat-vote curve associated with the districting ￿.
II.C. Socially Optimal Districtings
We are interested in the problem of a districting authority who desires to maximize expected
aggregate utility.9 Aggregate utility when the median Independent has ideology m and the De-
mocrats have seat share S is given by:
W(S;m) = ￿ ￿ ￿[￿D(1 ￿ S)2 + ￿RS2 + ￿I
Z m+￿
m￿￿
(1 ￿ S ￿ x)2dx
2￿
]: (7)
6If the Democratic vote share is V , the median Independent has ideology m(V ) and hence expected







The districting authority’s problem is therefore to choose a districting ￿ to solve the problem
max
R V
V W(S(V j￿);m(V )) dV
V ￿V
s.t. ￿ 2 ￿:
(9)
A districting ￿ that solves this problem is a socially optimal districting.
The authority’s problem is complicated by the fact that there is not a one-to-one mapping
between districtings and seat-vote curves. The seat-vote curve is determined by the pattern of
critical vote thresholds across districts. As is clear from (5), the same pattern of critical vote
thresholds could in principle be achieved by many di￿erent districtings. To solve the problem,
therefore, it is simpler to think of the districting authority as directly choosing a seat-vote curve
but subject to the implementability constraint that there exists a districting that generates it.




V W(S(V );m(V )) dV
V ￿V
s.t. S(V ) = S(V j￿) for some ￿ 2 ￿.
(10)
The socially optimal districtings will then be those associated with the constrained optimal seat-
vote curve.
The di￿culties of handling the constraint that a seat-vote curve be generated by some feasible
districting make this a challenging problem. Accordingly, we begin the analysis by characterizing
the optimal relationship between seats and aggregate votes - the optimal seat-vote curve - ignoring
the constraint that it be generated by some feasible districting. We then investigate whether there
exist districtings that generate this optimal seat-vote curve. If there do exist such districtings,
these will clearly be optimal. This two-stage procedure will not totally eliminate the need to
consider the grand constrained optimization, but appears to do so in the empirically relevant
cases.
II.D. Discussion of the Model
7In developing a model in which to analyze optimal districting, we faced many di￿erent mod-
elling choices. In order for the reader to understand the reasons for the choices we have made, we
brie￿y discuss the key ones here.
A ￿rst question was how to assume that the ideological composition of the legislature impacted
citizens’ payo￿s. Tractability obviously dictated the use of a simple summary statistic of the
distribution of legislator ideologies. The median voter theorem not withstanding, we choose the
average rather than the median. This choice was motivated by two main considerations. First, the
median assumption corresponds to the idea that the party with the majority of seats is completely
decisive and minority party members have no in￿uence at all. We feel this is unrealistic. A real
world state legislature makes numerous decisions on many di￿erent areas of policy. Many of these
decisions will be made by small sub-committees of legislators. This gives a legislator in￿uence
even if he is not in the majority party. Re￿ecting this, we seriously doubt that voters would be
indi￿erent between a state legislature that is 51% Democrat and one that is 100% Democrat. In
an empirical analysis of policy outcomes in U.S. states, Besley and Case [2003] provide evidence
in support of this general view; in particular, conditional on the Democrats controlling the state
legislature, a 10% increase in the fraction Democrat in both the Lower and Upper House leads
to a $10 per-capita increase in government spending (in 1982 dollars). Second, we wanted to be
consistent with the existing literature which, given its focus on the properties of seat-vote curves,
clearly distinguishes between state legislatures with di￿erent sized majorities. Thus, we needed
the form of the seat-vote curve over its entire domain to matter for citizens’ welfare. But, under
the median assumption, the properties of the seat-vote curve are irrelevant for welfare over almost
all of its domain. All that matters is the vote share at which the Democrats become the majority
party.10
A second key modelling choice concerned the strategic choices faced by parties and candidates.
We abstract from such considerations by assuming: (i) that each party simply puts up candidates
who are party members and (ii) that members all share the same ideology. Moreover, we employ
the citizen-candidate assumption, so that candidates have no choice but to e￿ectively run on their
true ideologies.11 While it would certainly be interesting to extend the model to allow parties
some ￿exibility in candidate choice, we believe that assuming away strategic choices is the natural
place to start.12 The ￿rst reason is that, under a Downsian vision of political competition in which
candidates adopt the ideology that makes them most likely to win, it is not possible to consider
8the problem in terms of seat-vote curves.13 Both parties’ candidates in each district would adopt
the position of the expected median voter and which candidate won would have no signi￿cance
for welfare. Thus, the seat-vote curve and the ideas of partisan bias or responsiveness would cease
to have much meaning. The second point to note is that, once again, we feel that it is implicit
in the literature on estimating seat-vote curves that legislators from the same party have similar
ideologies. If this were not the case, the notions of responsiveness and bias would be much more
complicated. To illustrate, suppose that Democratic candidates came in two types - moderate
and extreme. Then, whether a given aggregate Democratic vote increase led to the election of
more moderate or more extreme Democrats would be very relevant for the true responsiveness
of the system. Accordingly, responsiveness could not simply be measured by the slope of the
seat-vote curve. Similarly, if Democrats get more seats when voters are evenly divided between
the parties, then the true bias would naturally depend upon how Democratic seats are divided
between moderates and extremists.
A third modelling choice concerned what to assume about citizens’ voting behavior. It is
important to note that an Independent voter who leans Democrat may be better o￿ when his
district elects a Republican if other districts disproportionately elect Democrats. For if his district
elected a Republican, the average legislator ideology would be closer to his ideal point. We
decided nonetheless to assume sincere voting (i.e., voting for the ideologically closest candidate)
for two reasons. First, assuming sophisticated voting would substantially complicate the analysis
because voters’ optimal decisions would be strategic and determined as part of a statewide voting
equilibrium. This equilibrium (which need not be unique) would of course be in￿uenced by the
districting. Second, as an empirical matter, it is not clear that most voters are this sophisticated.
Similar incentives to diverge from voting for the candidate closest to one’s own ideology arise
when voters are electing Congressional and Presidential candidates and policy outcomes depend
upon the ideologies of both Congress and the President (Alesina and Rosenthal [1995] and Fiorina
[1992]). However, using a data set on voting behavior in these elections, Degan and Merlo [2006]
show that sincere voting can explain virtually all individual-level observations.
A fourth issue was how to introduce uncertainty into citizens’ voting behavior. Our model
incorporates individual uncertainty, which is de￿ned as variation in voting behavior across Inde-
pendents in a given election and is captured by the parameter ￿, as well as aggregate uncertainty,
which is de￿ned as variation in voting behavior of a given Independent across elections and is cap-
9tured by the parameter ". It is clear that aggregate uncertainty is required in order to generate
a seat-vote curve.14 But rather than assume that all voters are subject to a uniform ideological
swing, we choose to assume that only Independents’ preferences were uncertain. We took this
approach for two reasons. First, with a uniform swing impacting all voters, our citizen-candidate
framework would imply that candidate ideologies would also shift and thus votes and seats would
be unchanged; this would clearly thwart our objective of generating a seat-vote curve. Second,
in our empirical analysis, as will be clear below, the year-to-year variation in voting returns is
used to identify the degree of variation in the ideology of Independent voters. Changes in partisan
ideology, by contrast, are not re￿ected in voting patterns if, for example, left-leaning Republicans
nonetheless vote for the Republican over the Democrat and thus it is not clear how the variation
in partisan ideology would be identi￿ed empirically.
A ￿fth choice was to assume that the districting authority could both observe group mem-
bership and could form districts freely with no geographic constraints. The former assumption
seems reasonable as a ￿rst approximation, since information about voters’ ideological attachments
is available through voter registration data or the study of past voting patterns (see the discus-
sion in Altman, Mac Donald and McDonald [2005]).15 The latter assumption is more di￿cult to
defend on realism grounds and the neglect of the requirement that districts be connected subsets
of some geographic space is certainly a weakness of the analysis. However, we feel that given the
di￿culty of knowing how to model geographic constraints, it makes sense to ￿rst understand what
optimal districtings look like without them. Moreover, as we will see below, when the optimal
seat-vote curve is implementable it can typically be implemented by a large class of districtings,
some of which look quite \straightforward". Hence geographic constraints may actually be easily
accommodated.
The ￿nal choice involved working with very speci￿c assumptions on citizens’ political prefer-
ences. Speci￿cally, we assume that citizens have quadratic loss functions and that the distribution
of Independents’ ideologies is uniform across its support. These assumptions are made to both
keep the theoretical problem tractable and to facilitate the development of an empirical method-
ology tightly tied to the theory. A key role of these assumptions is to ensure that the welfare
function de￿ned in (7) has a quadratic form. As we will see in the next section, this results in
the optimal seat-vote curve having a simple linear form. This linearity is of great help when
deriving the condition under which there exist districtings that make the seat-vote curve optimal.
10Furthermore, the quadratic form of the welfare function is key to enabling us to solve for optimal
districtings when this condition is violated. Obviously, it would be desirable to work with a more
general model, but both our assumptions (i.e., quadratic preferences and uniformly distributed
ideologies) are common in contemporary political economy models. Moreover, our formulation of
the problem and the concepts we introduce are general and the considerations that our analysis
identi￿es will be present in more general models.
III. SOME THEORETICAL RESULTS
This section explores the theory of socially optimal districting. It begins by characterizing the
optimal seat-vote curve. It then derives a necessary and su￿cient condition for this seat-vote curve
to be implementable. Next it describes what the districtings that generate the optimal seat-vote
curve look like when this condition is satis￿ed. It then brie￿y characterizes optimal districting
when the implementability condition is not satis￿ed. Finally, it derives a useful formula for the
welfare gains from optimal districting.
III.A. The Optimal Seat-vote Curve
The optimal seat-vote curve So(V ) describes the ideal relationship between Democratic seats
and aggregate votes ignoring the constraint that this relationship be generated by some feasible
districting. To avoid tedious integer concerns, we assume that the number of districts is very
large, so that we can treat S as a continuous variable de￿ned on the unit interval [0;1]. Then, we
obtain the following simple characterization of the optimal seat-vote curve:
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal seat-vote curve So : [V ;V ] ! [0;1] is given by
So(V ) = 1=2 + (￿D ￿ ￿R)(1=2 ￿ ￿) + 2￿(V ￿ 1=2): (11)
Proof. The optimal seat-vote curve So(V ) is such that for all V 2 [V ;V ]
So(V ) = arg max
S2[0;1]
W(S;m(V )):
Assuming an interior solution, So(V ) satis￿es the ￿rst order condition: @W(So;m(V ))=@S = 0.
Di￿erentiating (7) yields
@W(S;m)=@S = 2f￿D + ￿I(1 ￿ m) ￿ Sg:
11Thus, @W(So;m(V ))=@S = 0 if and only if So = ￿D + ￿I(1 ￿ m(V )): In addition, note that
@2W(S;m)=@S2 < 0 so that the ￿rst order condition is su￿cient for So to be optimal. Substituting
in the expression for m(V ) from (3) yields the result. ￿
Proposition 1 tells us that the optimal seat-vote curve is of the same linear form that has been
estimated in some of the early empirical literature; that is, S(V ) = 1=2 + b + r(V ￿ 1=2) where b
measures partisan bias and r measures responsiveness (see, for example, Tufte [1973]).16 The bias
of the optimal curve is (￿D ￿￿R)(1=2￿￿) and its responsiveness is 2￿. In sharp contrast to what
is implicitly assumed in the districting literature, the optimal curve exhibits partisan bias, and
this bias is in favor of the party with the largest partisan base. The responsiveness of the optimal
curve depends on the degree of variation in the preferences of swing voters.
The optimal seat-vote curve is illustrated in Figure I. The horizontal axis measures the aggre-
gate Democratic vote and the vertical the Democrats’ share of seats. Since ￿ < 1=2, the slope of
the optimal seat-vote curve is less than 1 meaning that the fraction of Democrat seats increases
at a constant but less than proportional rate as the aggregate Democrat vote increases. The
seat-vote curve intersects the 45o line when the aggregate vote is ￿D + ￿I=2: Thus, when exactly
half the Independents lean Democrat, the optimal share of Democratic seats is ￿D +￿I=2. Notice
also that So(V ) > 0 and So(V ) < 1 so that there are safe seats for both parties.
To understand why the optimal responsiveness is 2￿, note ￿rst that the welfare maximizing
Democratic seat share must be such that the social gains from increasing it marginally just equal
the social losses. With the quadratic preferences, this marginal condition implies that the Demo-
cratic seat share must be such as to make the ideology of the average legislator equal the average
ideology in the population. Thus, when the mean (which equals the median) Independent has
ideology m, the optimal Democrat seat share should be ￿D +￿I(1￿m) because this would make
the average ideology in the legislature equal to the population average - which is ￿R+￿Im. When
the aggregate Democrat vote share increases marginally, the change in the mean Independent’s
ideology is dm=dV = ￿2￿=￿I (see (3)) and hence the increase in the optimal Democrat seat share
is just 2￿. Recall that ￿ measures the diversity of views among Independents, so that respon-
siveness is positively correlated with this diversity. This is because the greater the diversity of
Independent views, the greater the change in mean Independent ideology signalled by any given
increase in vote share.
12To understand why the optimal seat-vote curve is biased, consider the case when the Democrats
get exactly half the aggregate vote (V = 1=2). If the optimal seat-vote curve were unbiased then
the Democrats should get half the seats (So(1=2) = 1=2). This would indeed be optimal if the
average ideology in the population were 1=2. However, while the median voter in the population
must have ideology 1=2 in this case, the average voter’s ideology will only equal 1=2 when the
fractions of Democrats and Republicans are equal. To see this, note from (3) that when V = 1=2,
the median Independent’s ideology must be m(1=2) = 1=2 + ￿(￿D ￿ ￿R)=￿I which implies that
the average ideology in the population is 1=2 + (￿R ￿ ￿D)(1=2 ￿ ￿). Thus, to make the average
legislator’s ideology equal to the population average it will be necessary to have the Democratic
seat share greater than 1=2 if ￿D exceeds ￿R. Fundamentally, then, the bias in the optimal seat-
vote curve stems from the fact that the ideology of the median voter will typically di￿er from
that of the average voter. This in turn re￿ects the fact that partisans feel more intensely about
ideology than do swing voters.
III.B. When is the Optimal Seat-vote Curve Implementable?
Having understood the nature of the optimal seat-vote curve, we now turn to the question
of implementability; that is, whether there exist districtings ￿ such that S(V j￿) = So(V ). Such
a districting would make the composition of the legislature such that average legislator ideology
always equals the population average. Clearly, this cannot be achieved by making each district a
microcosm of the community as a whole, because then all districts would vote in the same way and
the legislature would be either all Democrat or all Republican. However, with appropriate district
level heterogeneity, implementability seems possible. While the conditions that might guarantee
it are by no means obvious, it is apparent that the fraction of Independents must matter. For, if
there were no Independents, then the optimal seat-vote curve would be a single point and could be
implemented, for example, by creating a fraction ￿R districts majority Republican and a fraction
￿D districts majority Democrat. On the other hand, if the entire population were Independents,
then all districts would necessarily be identical and the optimal seat-vote curve is clearly not
implementable.17
Re￿ecting the importance of the fraction of Independents, we have the following key result:




+ " ￿ (￿ + ")ln(1 +
"
￿
)) ￿ minf￿D;￿Rg: (12)
13Proof. See Appendix.
The condition in Proposition 2 is that there be \enough" Republicans and Democrats relative
to Independents. There are several points to note about the condition. First, for all ￿, the
coe￿cient multiplying the fraction of Independents (i.e., "
2￿ + " ￿ (￿ + ")ln(1 + "
￿ )) is increasing
in " and converges to zero as " converges to zero. Thus, the optimal seat-vote curve is necessarily
implementable when the degree of aggregate uncertainty is su￿ciently small. Intuitively, even
though the districting authority cannot predict how any individual Independent voter will vote, it
can predict the fraction of Independents who will vote for each party. This enables it to achieve the
optimal Democratic seat share.18 Second, for given ", the coe￿cient is decreasing in ￿ and hence
the optimal seat-vote curve is more likely to be implementable when there is more individual
uncertainty. Intuitively, a larger ￿ makes the voting behavior of Independents as a group less
volatile for a given shift in the ideology of the median Independent.
How permissive is the condition in Proposition 2? It is worth noting here that for any values
of " and ￿ satisfying our assumptions, " ￿ (￿ + ")ln(1 + "
￿ ) and hence the coe￿cient multiplying
the fraction of Independents is less than "=2￿. This in turn is less than 1=2 and hence a su￿cient
condition for the optimal seat-vote curve to be implementable is that ￿I ￿ 2minf￿D;￿Rg. While
the empirical application to follow will provide a more complete test for implementability, we
simply note here that this requirement appears permissive. For example, according to data from
Erikson, Wright and McGuiver [1993], this su￿cient condition is violated in just four U.S. states.
III.C. The Optimal Districtings
What do the districtings that generate the optimal seat-vote curve look like? When the
condition of Proposition 2 is satis￿ed, we can use arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2 to
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(￿D;￿I) if i 2 (So(V );1]:
(13)
While this does not specify the fractions of Republicans ￿R(i), these can be readily obtained from
the equality ￿R(i) = 1 ￿ ￿D(i) ￿ ￿I(i).
14Districts i 2 [0;So(V )) are the safe Democratic seats. The fractions of Democrats and Inde-








This re￿ects the fact that the minimum fraction of Independents voting Democrat is ￿￿"
2￿ . Districts
i 2 (So(V );1] are the safe Republican seats and, because the maximum fraction of Independents
voting Democrat is ￿+"








Districts i 2 [So(V );So(V )] are the competitive districts. They are divided into Democrat-leaning
districts (i 2 [So(V );￿D + ￿I
2 )) and Republican-leaning districts (i 2 [￿D + ￿I
2 ;So(V )]). The
Democrat-leaning districts are populated by only Democrats and Independents, with the fraction
of Independents varying from ￿=(￿ +") to 1. These districts all elect a Democrat candidate when
the majority of Independents prefer the Democrats; i.e., when V ￿ ￿D + ￿I
2 . However, they di￿er
in their critical vote thresholds because they contain di￿erent fractions of Independents. Thus,
the fraction of these districts electing Democrats varies smoothly as the aggregate Democrat vote
share increases from V to ￿D + ￿I
2 . Similarly, the Republican-leaning districts are populated by
only Republicans and Independents, with the fraction of Independents varying from 1 to ￿=(￿ +").
These districts all elect Republicans when the majority of Independents prefer Republicans, but
the fraction electing a Republican varies smoothly as the aggregate vote share increases from
￿D + ￿I
2 to V .
Districtings of the form described in (13) are extreme in the sense that the competitive dis-
tricts have no voters of one type.19 It is reasonable to object that such districts are unlikely to
be practically feasible when account is taken of geographic constraints.20 In this regard, it is im-
portant to note that the optimal seat-vote curve can typically be implemented with much more
\straightforward" districtings. To illustrate, consider the class of districtings in which the fraction
of Independents is constant across districts. In this class, all that varies across districts is the
fraction of Democrats and Republicans. Then, we have the following result:
15PROPOSITION 3. The optimal seat-vote curve is implementable with a districting of the form
(￿D(i);￿I(i)) =
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The competitive districts in districtings of the form described in Proposition 3 can still be
divided into Democrat-leaning districts (i 2 [So(V );￿D + ￿I
2 ]) and Republican-leaning districts
(i 2 [￿D + ￿I
2 ;So(V )]). However, all districts contain all three types of voters. The Democrat-
leaning districts just have a greater fraction of Democrats than Republicans, with the ratio of
Democrats to Republicans varying from [1￿￿I(￿￿"
￿ )]=[1￿￿I(￿+"
￿ )] to 1. The Republican-leaning
districts have a greater fraction of Republicans, with the ratio of Democrats to Republicans varying
from 1 to [1 ￿ ￿I(￿+"
￿ )]=[1 ￿ ￿I(￿￿"
￿ )].
The important point to note is that the condition of Proposition 3 is not that much more
restrictive than that of Proposition 2. As an illustration of this point, Figure II plots the sets
of (￿D;￿I) pairs that satisfy the conditions of Propositions 2 and 3 under the assumption that
" = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:2. The horizontal axis measures ￿I and the vertical axis measures ￿D. The
entire triangular area represents the set of (￿D;￿I) pairs satisfying the condition of Proposition
2. The shaded area represents the set of pairs that satisfy the condition of Proposition 2 but not
that of Proposition 3.
III.D. What Happens when the Optimal Seat-vote curve is not Implementable?
While the condition of Proposition 2 is permissive, it is worth understanding what the con-
strained optimal seat-vote curve looks like when it is not satis￿ed. In this case, the implementabil-
ity constraint in problem (10) must bind. Solving for the constrained optimal seat-vote curve is
an intricate problem because of the di￿culty of accounting for the implementability constraint.
Thus, we will simply provide a ￿avor of the solution and refer the reader to our working paper
(Coate and Knight [2005]) for the complete details.
When the condition of Proposition 2 is not satis￿ed, there are three possibilities. First, the
condition is violated for ￿D and there are not enough Democrats. Second, it is violated for ￿R
16and there are not enough Republicans. Finally, it is violated for both ￿D and ￿R and there are
not enough Democrats or Republicans. The principles involved in the ￿rst and second case are
identical and, in the third case, the constrained optimal seat-vote curve is just a combination of
those emerging in the ￿rst and second cases. Thus, it will su￿ce to discuss the ￿rst case.
Figure III illustrates the constrained optimal seat-vote curve - denoted S￿(V ) - when there are
not enough Democrats. Panel (a) illustrates the case in which ￿D is less than ￿I"
2￿ (1￿￿ ￿2") and
Panel (b) the case in which ￿D exceeds ￿I"
2￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2"). In either case, the constrained optimal
seat-vote curve lies below the optimal seat-vote curve on the interval [V ;￿D + ￿I
2 ) and equals it
thereafter. What this tells us is when the median Independent favors the Republicans, it is not
possible to elect enough Democrats to make the average ideology of the legislature equal to the
population average. However, when the median Independent favors the Democrats there is no
longer a problem, because Democrats can be elected from districts that are populated solely (or
largely) by Independents.
In the case illustrated in Panel (a) the logic of the constrained optimum is to allocate the
available Democrats to create as many safe Democrat districts as possible. These safe seats
contain only Democrats and Independents and the fraction of Democrats is the minimal necessary
to always give the Democrat candidate a majority. The jump in the seat-vote curve is created by
the presence of a group of Independent only districts. These districts elect a Democrat if and only
if the majority of Independents favor the Democrats which is why the jump occurs at the vote
share ￿D + ￿I
2 .
In the case illustrated in Panel (b) the constrained optimum involves safe Democrat seats but
some Democrats are also grouped with Independents to form competitive districts. This generates
the convex portion of the seat-vote curve on the interval [V ; b V ). In addition, there are Independent
only districts so that the seat-vote curve again has a jump at the vote share ￿D + ￿I
2 . As ￿D gets
larger (holding constant ￿I) the point at which the seat-vote curve ￿attens (b V ) moves to the right
and, for su￿ciently large ￿D, equals ￿D + ￿I
2 and the ￿at spot disappears. Moreover, the convex
portion of the seat-vote curve straightens out. The complex shape of the seat-vote curve in this
case stems from an inherent non-convexity created by the implementability constraint in problem
(10).
III.E. The Welfare Gain to Socially Optimal Districting
Returning to the case in which the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable, what would be the
17welfare gain associated with implementation? Conveniently, the gain turns out to be proportional
to the squared distance between the baseline and optimal seat-vote curves. To see this, note ￿rst
that expected citizen welfare can be expressed as a function of the baseline and optimal seat-vote
curves. Letting EW￿(S(V )) denote expected social welfare under the seat vote curve S(V ), we
have:21
LEMMA. It is the case that
EW￿(S(V )) = ￿ ￿ ￿fc + E[S(V )2] ￿ 2E[S(V )So(V )]g (18)
where c is a constant given by c = ￿D + ￿I[1=4 + "2=3 + ￿2=3]:
Proof. See Coate and Knight [2006].
Using this formula to compute the welfare gain immediately establishes:
PROPOSITION 4. The welfare gain from socially optimal districting can be written as
G = EW￿(So(V )) ￿ EW￿(S(V )) = ￿E[(So(V ) ￿ S(V ))2]: (19)
Intuitively, the larger the distance from the optimal seat-vote curves, the larger are the welfare
gains associated with socially optimal districting.
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
From an empirical perspective, we would like to know how seat-vote curves generated by actual
legislative districting plans di￿er from optimal seat-vote curves. We would also like to know if
the condition for implementability is satis￿ed. Finally, if this condition is satis￿ed, we would
like to know the magnitude of the welfare gains from implementing the optimal seat-vote curve.
This section presents our methodology for doing all this. In developing this, we assume that the
researcher has estimates at the district level of the mean and standard deviation of the Democratic
vote share under the districting plan in question. In addition, we assume that the analyst knows
the statewide fraction of voters who identify as Independents.22
IV.A. Estimating Seat-vote Curves
As explained in Section II.C, seat-vote curves are determined by the range of possible statewide
Democratic vote shares [V ;V ] and the pattern of district-speci￿c threshold vote levels (V ￿(i)). We
will show that both the range of vote levels and the vote thresholds can be expressed solely as a
18function of the means and standard deviations of the district-level and statewide Democratic vote
share. The ￿rst step in establishing this is to provide expressions for these moments. Beginning
with the district-speci￿c moments, the mean and standard deviation of Democratic votes in district
i, as expressed in equation (1), are
￿i = E(V (i)) = ￿D(i) + 1
2￿I(i) = 1
2[1 + ￿D(i) ￿ ￿R(i)]
￿i =
p









Observe that the standard deviation of the Democratic vote share is proportional to the fraction
of Independents. It is increasing in the degree to which the median Independent shifts support
between the two candidates from election to election (") but is decreasing in the diversity of
preferences among Independents (￿).
Turning to the statewide moments, we take cross-district averages of the district-speci￿c means
and standard deviations to obtain:
￿ = E(V ) = ￿D + 1
2￿I = 1
2[1 + ￿D ￿ ￿R]
￿ =
p









Using these state-wide moments, we can now write the maximum and minimum statewide Demo-
cratic vote shares as
V = V (1=2 + ") = ￿ ￿
p
3￿




Moreover, using the district-speci￿c and statewide moments and the de￿nition of V ￿(i) in equation
(3), we can write the vote threshold for electing a Democratic candidate in district i as follows:
V ￿(i) = ￿ +
￿
￿i
(1=2 ￿ ￿i): (23)
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S(V ) = maxfi : ￿ +
￿
￿i
(1=2 ￿ ￿i) ￿ V g: (24)
19IV.B. Estimating the Optimal Seat-vote Curve
Using the fact that ￿D ￿ ￿R = 2￿ ￿ 1, we can re-write the optimal seat-vote curve described
in Proposition 1 as follows:
So(V ) = 1=2 + (2￿ ￿ 1)(1=2 ￿ ￿) + 2￿(V ￿ 1=2): (25)
Observe that the optimal seat-vote curve and, in particular, its responsiveness and partisan bias
parameters depend critically upon the diversity of preferences among Independents (￿). Even with
information on the statewide standard deviation, this parameter ￿ cannot be identi￿ed separately
from the underlying parameters ￿I and " (see equation (14)).23 However, it is possible to identify
the ratio ￿ = "=￿, with data on the statewide fraction of Independents (￿I) and the statewide










Further, using the theoretical restriction on the sum of these preference parameters " + ￿ ￿ 1=2,





In the baseline analysis of the empirical application to follow, we assume that optimal responsive-
ness equals this upper bound. In addition, as a robustness check, we allow the optimal respon-
siveness to fall in a range below this upper bound.
IV.C. Verifying the Condition for Implementation
The condition for implementability presented in Proposition 2 cannot be veri￿ed directly with-
out information on the underlying preference parameters (";￿). As just noted however, with out-
side information on the fraction of Independents, we can identify the ratio ￿ = "=￿. We can
use information on this ratio to place an upper bound on the coe￿cient associated with the im-
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20Substituting in the expression for ￿ from equation (26) and using the fact that ￿ = ￿D + ￿I=2,
this su￿cient condition can be re-written as
￿I ￿ 2min(￿ ￿
p
3￿;1 ￿ ￿ ￿
p
3￿): (30)
Thus, the fraction of Independents must be below a critical value, the calculation of which only
requires information on the statewide mean and standard deviation of the Democratic vote share.
IV.D. Estimating the Welfare Gains from Socially Optimal Districting
Given that we only observe voting outcomes, which do not reveal the intensity of voter prefer-
ences for one party over another, the parameters of the surplus expression (￿;￿) in equation (7)
are not identi￿ed in the empirical analysis. However, we can use the theoretical restriction on the
ratio of these parameters in order to calculate the range of proportionate welfare gains. To this
end, ￿rst note that the percentage increase in aggregate welfare from socially optimal districting
can be written as follows:
￿G =
EW￿(So(V )) ￿ EW￿(S(V ))
EW￿(S(V ))
: (31)







￿E[(So(V ) ￿ S(V ))2]
1 ￿
￿
￿fc + E[S(V )2] ￿ 2E[S(V )So(V )]g
: (32)
Recall that the ratio ￿=￿ is the fraction of the surplus a partisan obtains from having a
perfectly congruent legislature that is dissipated by having a legislature composed entirely of the
opposition party. When parties are not that polarized in terms of their underlying ideologies or
when the legislature is responsible for choosing only policies on which there is little disagreement
across ideologies (for example, spending on public safety and highway maintenance) this ratio may
be close to zero. When parties are polarized and are choosing policies on which there is strong
ideological disagreement (such as the level of transfer payments for the poor or the regulation of
abortion), this ratio may be close to one. In the former case, districting is not very important,
while in the latter case it is crucial to citizen welfare. Using the restriction that ￿=￿ 2 [0;1], we




) ￿ ￿G(1): (33)
21Because the upper bound will only be relevant for legislatures in states in which parties are
polarized and which choose policies on which there is strong disagreement, we will provide welfare
calculations for di￿erent values of this key ratio (￿=￿) in the empirical application to follow.
We next turn to the measurement of this welfare gain. Inserting equation (25) into equation







￿)f(￿o)2 + 2￿oro￿ + (ro)2(￿2 + ￿2) ￿ 2E[(￿o + roV )S(V )] + E[S(V )2]g
1 ￿ (
￿
￿)fc + E[S(V )2] ￿ 2￿oE[S(V )] ￿ 2roE[V S(V )]g
(34)
where ro = 2￿ represents optimal responsiveness and ￿o = ￿(1 ￿ 2￿) represents the vertical




" ["2=3+￿2=3￿1=4]; and hence, given a particular value of the ratio ￿=￿ and the parameter
￿, this expression can be evaluated by computing three moments associated with the seat-vote
curve: E[S(V )]; E[S(V )2]; and E[V S(V )]. Finally, we have developed expressions relating these
moments to the district-speci￿c vote thresholds (V ￿(i)), which, as noted above, can in turn be
related to the moments of the Democratic vote share; we refer readers to Coate and Knight [2006]
for the exact form of these expressions.
V. APPLICATION TO U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES
In this section, we apply our methodology to analyze the districting plans used to elect U.S.
state legislators during the 1990s districting period.24 For consistency with the theoretical frame-
work, we focus on states with single-member districts.25 In addition, given the bicameral nature
of state legislatures, we follow the existing empirical literature on redistricting and focus on elec-
tions to the Lower House. As shown in Table I, we have complete data for 28 states, most of
which adopted redistricting plans in 1992 and then again in 2002. For these states, there were
￿ve elections held under the 1990s districting plan: 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.26 To esti-
mate the moments of the Democratic vote shares under these districting plans, we use data from
Ansolabehere and Snyder [2002] on state legislative election returns together with Census data on
voter characteristics by state legislative district.27 We also use state-level estimates of the fraction
of Independent voters derived from annual New York Times surveys in which voters are asked to
self-identify as Republican, Democrat, or Independent.28
V.A. Estimation of Moments
22There are a number of possible methods for estimating the moments of the voting distribution
under a districting plan, the appropriateness of which may vary from application to application.
With a su￿ciently long panel, for example, moments in the key expressions above could simply be
replaced with their analogous sample moments. However, because redistricting typically occurs
every ten years in the United States and elections every two years, in our application we have
￿ve observations per district at most. In addition, this approach is problematic given that sample
moments cannot be calculated for districts with uncontested elections, which occur frequently
in state legislative elections. As an alternative, we use an econometric model for estimating the
moments as a function of the characteristics of voters residing in the district. This approach
circumvents the short panel problem by modeling the moments in terms of a small number of
parameters and thus does not require the estimation of two parameters, or moments, per district. It
also circumvents the problem of uncontested districts as it allows the analyst to use characteristics
of voters residing in the districts in order to predict these two moments. Finally, as will be seen
below, the use of an econometric model allows the researcher to compute con￿dence intervals
around key measures of our welfare analysis, such as the gains to socially optimal districting.
Before providing a speci￿c econometric formulation for these moments, it is instructive to note
that, using equations (1) and (20), the Democratic vote share in district i can be written as a
linearly separable function of the district-speci￿c mean and variance along with a shock to the
preferences of Independent voters:




￿ (1=2 ￿ m) is distributed uniformly with mean zero and variance equal to 1. This
formulation then naturally leads to the following speci￿cation, in which the two moments are







where Xi denotes a vector of observed voter characteristics, (￿1;￿2) denotes parameters associated
with these observed characteristics, (￿i,￿i) denote district-speci￿c random e￿ects, assumed to be
distributed standard normal, and (￿1,￿2) are parameters associated with the random e￿ects.
23Re￿ecting our use of panel data, we next introduce a time dimension (t) and, inserting the above
parameterizations for the two moments into equation (35), we obtain the following random e￿ects
model with heteroskedasticity:
Vt(i) = X0
i￿1 + ￿1￿i + uit
ln(u2
it) = X0
i￿2 + ￿2￿i + ln(w2
t)
: (37)
Before describing the estimation procedure associated with the econometric model in equation
(37), it is important to note two sources of uncertainty facing the analyst in estimating the
moments in equation (36). First, the analyst does not observe the true parameters (￿1;￿2,￿1,￿2)
and must instead use estimated parameters. Second, the random e￿ects (￿i,￿i) are unobserved
by the econometrician. We deal with both of these issues of uncertainty via a bootstrapping
simulation procedure. In particular, for each replication r = 1;2;:::;100; an associated sample
of size N is drawn with replacement from our dataset of N districts, where N is the number of
districts with at least one contested election in our dataset.29 Given that we draw with replacement,
a given district in our dataset may be not represented, represented once, or represented multiple
times in the sample associated with a given replication r. For each of these 100 samples, we then
estimate the parameters of equation (37) via a standard two-step approach. First, we estimate a
subset of the parameters (￿r
1;￿r
1) using a random-e￿ects panel data regression of votes in district
i (Vt(i)) on observed voter characteristics in district i (Xi). In the second step, we regress the
log of the squared residual obtained from the ￿rst step on observed district characteristics and
obtains estimates of the remaining parameters of interest (￿r
2;￿r
2).30 Taken across replications, we






Table II provides our estimates of the parameters ￿1 and ￿2 using the original dataset along
with the bootstrap standard errors.31 In addition to the district characteristics reported in Table
II, we also included a set of state dummy variables in both equations, thereby allowing two districts
with identical observable characteristics but in di￿erent states to have di￿erent voting patterns.
As shown in the ￿rst column, the mean vote share for the Democratic Party (￿i), is increasing
in the percent urban and suburban (both of these are relative to the omitted category - percent
rural), percent with a college degree, percent over age 65, percent African-American, and percent
Hispanic (both of these are relative to the omitted category - percent white) but is decreasing in
household income. As shown in the second column, the variance is decreasing in household income
24and in the percent African-American.




2) associated with replication r are then used to compute
the key moments of the voting distribution for every district in our original dataset, including those
districts with only uncontested elections. Note that even with the parameter estimates from a
given replication r and data on district characteristics (Xi), we do not learn the district-speci￿c
mean and variance of the voting distribution, as expressed in equation (36), because the random
e￿ects (￿i,￿i) are unobserved. To get around this problem, random e￿ects (￿r
i ,￿r
i) are drawn from
the standard normal distribution for each replication r and for each district i in our dataset.32
The district-speci￿c moments (￿r
i;￿r
















As should be clear from equation (38), our simulation approach accounts for two forms of uncer-
tainty described above: the use of estimated parameters along with the inability of the econome-
trician to observe the exact realization of the random e￿ects.
With estimates of district-speci￿c moments in hand, corresponding statewide moments (￿r;￿r)
associated with replication r are then calculated by averaging across the district-speci￿c mo-
ments. Key objects of interest, such as the vote threshold for electing a Democratic candidate,
as expressed in equation (23), can then be calculated for each district i and replication r; and
it follows that a state-speci￿c seat-vote curve Sr(V ) can be calculated for each replication r: Fi-
nally, aggregating across all replications r = 1;2;::100, key aspects of the distribution of seat-vote
curves (Sr(V ))r=100
r=1 , such as average responsiveness, median responsiveness, and the 90-percent
con￿dence interval for responsiveness, are calculated for each state.33
V.B. Seat-vote Curves
Given that a plot of all replications would be cumbersome, we begin by presenting the seat-
vote curves from a particular replication, that associated with the median welfare gain from
socially optimal districting (as expressed in equation (34)). Note that these seat-vote curves are
presented primarily for illustration, and we will subsequently present statistics pertaining to the
entire distribution of seat-vote curves across replications. As shown in Figure IV, the range of
possible statewide support for the Democratic Party seems reasonable, at least in this particular
replication. For example, in New York, a heavily Democratic state, the Party receives support on
25the range [0.56,0.70], while in Utah, a heavily Republican state, the Democrats receive support on
the range [0.38,0.50]. Notice also that the seat-vote curve is close to linear in some states, such as
Maine and Pennsylvania, while it has important non-linearities in other states, such as Delaware
and Virginia.
As shown in column 1 of Table III, the responsiveness associated with these estimated seat-
vote curves exceeds two in every state, and, in some states, exceeds three.34 Findings of signi￿cant
responsiveness are quite common in the existing literature, which has focused on a responsiveness
of three, a ￿nding that has become known as the \Cube Law" (King and Browning [1987]). Given
its prominence in the existing literature, we next report the partisan bias associated with the
estimated seat-vote curve, as measured by S(1=2) ￿ 1=2: Notice that in the four states for which
V = 1=2 does not lie in the range of possible Democratic vote shares, this measure cannot be
computed. Although this measure is based upon only a single point on the seat-vote curve, it
is nonetheless interesting, as shown in column 4, that the seat-vote curve is biased towards the
Republicans in 18 states but towards the Democrats in only 4 states; the seat-vote curve is unbiased
in Montana and Oregon. The cross-state average bias of -3% implies that, when voters are equally
split, Republicans would secure 53% of the seats on average, relative to 47% for Democrats, and
would thus hold a signi￿cant advantage of 6% in the legislature.
V.C. Optimal Seat-vote Curves
For comparison purposes, Figure IV also includes the optimal seat-vote curves from the repli-
cation associated with the median welfare gain for each state. These are plotted under the assump-
tion that optimal responsiveness, 2￿, is at its maximal level 1=(1+￿) in each state. It is apparent
from Figure IV, that the actual seat-vote curves are overly responsive in all cases, suggesting that
districting plans used to elect U.S. state legislators during the 1990s created too few safe seats.
Column 2 of Table III reports the responsiveness of the optimal seat-vote curve. As noted in
the theoretical section, optimal responsiveness is always below one, while actual responsiveness
substantially exceeds one in all cases. That is, as shown in column 3, the di￿erence between actual
and optimal responsiveness is close to 2 in most states.
Column 5 of Table III reports the partisan bias associated with the optimal seat-vote curve,
which is de￿ned as So(1=2) ￿ 1=2. While the estimated seat-vote curve was shown to be biased
towards Republicans in this particular replication, the optimal seat-vote curve tends to be biased
towards the Democrats. Thus, the bias towards the Republicans exhibited in the actual seat-vote
26curves cannot generally be justi￿ed as optimal. As noted above, an important objection to this
comparison of actual and optimal partisan bias is that it just tells us about the properties of
the curves at the vote share V = 1=2. For a more global comparison, we computed the expected
Democratic seat share under the estimated and optimal seat-vote curves (E(S(V )) and E(So(V ))).
Column 7 of Table III reports the di￿erence in this expected seat-share. When this di￿erence is
positive, the expected Democratic seat share is higher than optimal. The interesting thing to note
is that, in this expected seat sense, there appears to be no obvious bias towards Republicans. If
anything, this alternative bias measure suggests that districting systems are overly biased towards
Democrats as this measure is positive in over one-half of the states. This makes us hesitant to
draw any strong conclusions concerning the general direction of bias.
The properties of seat-vote curves reported in Table III are based upon a single replication,
that associated with the median welfare gain. Table IV reports more general ￿ndings of our
analysis via the properties of the entire distribution of replicated seat-vote curves. The ￿rst three
columns report the mean di￿erence in responsiveness between estimated and optimal seat-vote
curves across replications, the median di￿erence in responsiveness across replications, and the
90 percent con￿dence interval for the di￿erence across replications. This con￿dence interval is
computed by ranking our measures of responsiveness across replications and then choosing the
5th and 95th percentile of that distribution. As shown, the ￿nding that the estimated seat-vote
curve is overly responsive in Table III is a robust ￿nding as the 90 percent con￿dence interval for
the di￿erence in responsiveness is positive in all states. The ￿ndings regarding partisan bias, by
contrast, are more mixed. As shown in columns 4 and 5, the mean and median di￿erence in bias
is negative in most cases, re￿ecting the previous ￿nding that estimated seat-vote curves tend to
be overly biased in favor of the Republicans. The con￿dence interval, however, includes zero for
all except nine states, and thus our ￿nding that the actual seat-vote curve is overly biased in favor
of Republicans should be interpreted with caution. Similarly, as shown in the ￿nal three columns,
no de￿nitive conclusions can be drawn in a statistical sense regarding the di￿erence in expected
seats.
V.D. Verifying the Condition for Implementation
As shown in Table V, the condition for implementation is satis￿ed with probability one in
every state. That is, in every replication, the fraction of Independents was below the maximal
level described in equation (30). The state closest to not satisfying the requirements is Rhode
27Island, which is reported to have 51% Independents, just slightly below the cross-replication
average maximal level of 58%. In no replications, however, did this maximum level fall below the
reported 51% share of Independents. In summary, these results demonstrate that the condition
for implementability of the optimal seat-vote curve is indeed permissive, being satis￿ed in all of
28 states included in our analysis and by a large margin in all cases except for Rhode Island.35
V.E. Welfare Gains
Given that the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in all states and across all replications,
it is interesting to measure the welfare gains associated with socially optimal districting. To begin
with, we compute the percentage welfare gains under the assumptions that the ratio ￿=￿ is at its
maximal level (i.e., 1) and that optimal responsiveness is at its maximal level in each state (i.e.,
1=(1+￿)). As shown in Table VI, the percentage welfare gains to socially optimal districting are
relatively small; averaged across all states, these median and average gains are reported at 1.81%
and 1.88%, respectively. There is, however, considerable variation across states with Rhode Island
and South Carolina at the opposite extremes. A visual comparison of the seat-vote curves in
Figure IV supports these welfare calculations as the seat-vote curves are similar in states with low
potential welfare gains but quite di￿erent in states with large potential welfare gains.36 Regarding
the precision of these estimates, the con￿dence intervals demonstrate that the upper bounds on
these welfare gains are also quite low, ranging from 1.47% in South Carolina to 6.02% in Rhode
Island.37
For a sense of how these results depend on the speci￿c assumptions about the parameters ￿=￿
and 2￿, Table VII reports the average welfare gains, where the average is taken across both states
and replications, associated with socially optimal districting arising under di￿erent parameter
values. We allow the ratio ￿=￿ to vary from 0:25 to 1 and allow 2￿ to vary from 0:25=(1 + ￿)
to 1=(1 + ￿) in each state. The notation ￿ refers to the numerator in the ratio ￿=(1 + ￿), so
that the case in which 2￿ is set equal to 0:25=(1 + ￿) in each state corresponds to ￿ = 0:25; the
case in which 2￿ is set equal to 0:5=(1 + ￿) in each state corresponds to ￿ = 0:5; etc. As shown,
holding the ratio ￿=￿ constant, the welfare gains to socially optimal districting, averaged across all
states, are uniformly increasing as the parameter ￿ is reduced. This pattern re￿ects the fact that
reductions in the parameter ￿ are associated with reductions in optimal responsiveness, which,
as shown previously, was already below the responsiveness associated with the estimated seat-
vote curves. Holding the parameter ￿ constant and reducing the ratio ￿=￿; we have that welfare
28is uniformly decreasing. As explained above, districting matters less for welfare as this ratio
decreases, re￿ecting the fact that the con￿ict between citizens over the available policy choices is
less severe.
The lesson to be drawn from Tables VI and VII is that the welfare gains from socially optimal
districting are relatively small as a proportion of the total surplus generated by state legislatures.
In principle, there may be two reasons for this. The ￿rst is that the districting plans that states
actually implement are relatively close to optimal plans. The second is that, because of the
diverse ideological make up of the U.S. states, aggregate welfare is relatively insensitive to varying
districting plans. To get a feel for which of these views is correct, we computed the proportionate
welfare gains that would arise from implementing the optimal seat-vote curve over the case of
identical districting in which each district is a microcosm of the whole. The idea is that if these
gains are large, then the second view cannot be correct. Table VIII reports the results under the
same parametric assumptions that underlie Table VI and they strongly suggest that the second
view is not correct. Thus, it seems that the states are doing districting in a way that is generating
seat-vote curves that are relatively close to optimal.38
A further interesting benchmark is the seat-vote curve that would be generated by a propor-
tional representation electoral system (PR); that is, S(V ) = V . As shown in Table IX, introducing
PR would raise welfare in all states. Moreover, the gains from a movement from PR to the optimal
seat-vote curve, are very small, ranging from an average of 0.02% in several states to 0.08% in
Oklahoma under our baseline parameter values. These ￿ndings suggest that almost all the welfare
gains associated with optimal districting could be achieved via PR. This result re￿ects several
features of the seat-vote curves underlying these welfare calculations. First, the PR seat-vote
curve is linear, a feature shared by the optimal, but not actual, seat-vote curves. Second, the
PR seat-vote curve has responsiveness of 1, while responsiveness associated with the estimated
seat-vote exceeds 1 in all cases. As noted previously, optimal responsiveness is less than 1.39
VI. CONCLUSION
It will be clear to the reader that the exploration of socially optimal districting outlined in this
paper is very much a ￿rst step. The simple model underlying the analysis ignores many factors
that are important in real world discussions of districting. Nonetheless, the model provides a way
of thinking about the problem that is consistent with a long tradition of empirical research on
29districting and both the theoretical and empirical analysis have yielded some interesting ￿ndings.
We conclude the paper by summarizing what we see as the most signi￿cant of these.
The ￿rst notable result concerns the nature of the optimal relationship between seats and
votes. Under the assumptions of our model, the optimal seat-vote curve is of the same linear
form that has been estimated in some of the early empirical literature. In sharp contrast to what
has been implicitly assumed in the districting literature, the optimal curve is biased and this bias
favors the party with the largest partisan base. The responsiveness of the optimal curve depends
on the degree of variation in the preferences of swing voters. This responsiveness is always less
than one so that the change in seat share optimally damps the change in vote share.
The second interesting ￿nding relates to the condition under which there exist districtings
that generate the optimal seat-vote curve. This condition, which requires that the fraction of
Independents be not \too large", is permissive and is satis￿ed in all states in our data set. More-
over, when this condition is satis￿ed, there will typically exist many di￿erent districtings that can
generate the optimal seat-vote curve. These districtings involve safe seats for both parties and
a range of competitive districts that vary smoothly in terms of their ideological mix. They look
su￿ciently straightforward to be achievable even when geographic constraints are accounted for.
This suggests that it may be reasonable to regard the optimal seat-vote curve as an attainable
benchmark for districters in the U.S. states.
The third key result concerns the di￿erence between optimal and actual seat-vote curves. We
￿nd that the seat-vote curves generated by the districting plans used in the 1990s by the states in
our data set are overly responsive to changes in voter preferences. This result seems unlikely to be
an artifact of our particular dataset. As we have previously noted, while optimal responsiveness
must be less than 1, prior empirical evidence has typically estimated responsiveness well in excess
of 1. In terms of partisan bias, we ￿nd no evidence of a direction of bias towards one party or the
other when the measure of the di￿erence in expected seats is employed.
The fourth ￿nding relates to the potential welfare gains from socially optimal districting for
the states in our data set. While there is signi￿cant variation across states, we ￿nd that these
gains are quite small, at least relative to the overall surplus generated by state legislatures. We
have argued that this is because states’ districting plans were reasonably close to optimal rather
than because aggregate welfare was insensitive to varying districting plans. We also ￿nd that
almost all of the welfare gains from socially optimal districting could be realized by implementing
30a proportional representation system.
31APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. In developing the conditions under which the optimal seat-vote curve is
implementable it is more convenient to work with the inverse optimal seat-vote curve than the
optimal seat-vote curve. In general, an inverse seat-vote curve is described by a triple fi;i;V ￿(￿)g
where i and i are scalars satisfying 0 ￿ i ￿ i ￿ 1 and V ￿(￿) is a non-decreasing function de￿ned
on [i;i] with range [V ;V ]. The interpretation is that i is the fraction of districts that are safe
Democrat; 1 ￿ i the fraction that are safe Republican; and V ￿(i) is the critical vote threshold for
competitive district i 2 [i;i]. Given a seat vote curve S(V ) we form its inverse in the following way:
i is just S(V ); i is S(V ) and for all i 2 [i;i], V ￿(i) is such that S(V ) = i. Thus, given the optimal
seat-vote curve described in Proposition 1, the optimal inverse seat-vote curve fio;io;V ￿
o (i)g is
given by
io = ￿D + ￿I(1=2 ￿ "); (39)
io = ￿D + ￿I(1=2 + "); (40)
and for all i 2 [io;io]
V ￿
o (i) =
[i ￿ (￿D + ￿I
2 )(1 ￿ 2￿)]
2￿
: (41)
We will need the following de￿nitions for the proof. A districting is a description of the
fractions of voter types in each district f(￿D(i);￿I(i)) : i 2 [0;1]g where for all i, (￿D(i);￿I(i))
belongs to the two dimensional unit simplex ￿2
+. (We omit the fraction of Republicans since
￿R(i) = 1 ￿ ￿D(i) ￿ ￿I(i).) A districting f(￿D(i);￿I(i)) : i 2 [0;1]g is feasible if
R 1
0 ￿I(i)di = ￿I
and
R 1
0 ￿D(i)di = ￿D. A districting f(￿D(i);￿I(i)) : i 2 [0;1]g generates the inverse seat-vote
curve fi;i;V ￿(￿)g if: (i) ￿D + ￿I[
1=2￿￿D(i)
￿I(i) ] ￿ V for all i 2 [0;i), (ii) ￿D + ￿I[
1=2￿￿D(i)
￿I(i) ] ￿ V for
all i 2 (i;1], and, (iii) ￿D +￿I[
1=2￿￿D(i)
￿I(i) ] = V ￿(i) for all i 2 [i;i]. Requirement (i) is that districts
i 2 [0;i) are safe Democrat seats and requirement (ii) is that districts i 2 (i;1] are safe Republican
seats. Requirement (iii) is that competitive district i 2 [i;i] has a critical vote threshold just equal
to V ￿(i). A seat-vote curve is implementable if there exists a feasible districting that generates its
associated inverse seat-vote curve.
We want to know if the optimal seat-vote curve So(V ) is implementable. We begin by de-
scribing the districtings that can generate the optimal inverse seat-vote curve fio;io;V ￿
o (i)g. In
describing this set, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the safe Democrat and Repub-
lican districts are identical. For example, if (￿D(i);￿I(i)) varied over the safe Democrat seats
32i 2 [0;io), then we could create a districting with identical safe Democrat districts that used







io) for all i 2 [0;io). Thus, we may assume that (￿D(i);￿I(i)) = (￿D;￿I)
for all i 2 [0;io) and (￿D(i);￿I(i)) = (￿D;￿I) for all i 2 (io;1] where (￿D;￿I);(￿D;￿I) 2 ￿2
+.
















These inequalities re￿ect the fact that the minimum and maximum fraction of Independents voting
Democrat are, respectively, ￿￿"
2￿ and ￿+"
2￿ .
In the competitive districts [io;io], requirement (iii) ties down what the function ￿D(i) must









(y ￿ ￿D): (44)
In addition, we must have that (￿I(i);f(￿I(i);V ￿
o (i))) 2 ￿2
+ for all i 2 [io;io]. This constraint




o (i) ￿ ￿D)
;
￿I
2(￿I + ￿D ￿ V ￿
o (i))
g]: (45)
Notice that V ￿
o (i) ￿ ￿D is less than ￿I + ￿D ￿ V ￿
o (i) if and only if V ￿
o (i) is less than ￿I
2 + ￿D:
Letting b io = ￿I
2 + ￿D, it is the case that V ￿
o (i) < ￿I
2 + ￿D for all i 2 [io;b io) and V ￿
o (i) ￿ ￿I
2 + ￿D










We conclude from this that the districtings that generate the optimal inverse seat-vote curve
fio;io;V ￿
o (i)g can be described by the set of all f(￿D;￿I);(￿D;￿I);￿I(i)g such that (￿D;￿I) and
(￿D;￿I) belong to ￿2
+ and satisfy (42) and (43) and ￿I(i) satis￿es (46) for all i 2 [io;io]. We
call this the set of generating districtings and denote it by ￿. The question of implementability is
whether there exists a districting in this set which is feasible; i.e., which satis￿es
io￿I + (1 ￿ io)￿I +
Z io
io
￿I(i)di = ￿I (47)
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o (i))di = ￿D: (48)
How do we know when this is true? The following observation is key to the method that we
use. Let ￿￿ denote the subset of generating districtings that satisfy the feasibility requirement
that the average fraction of Independents equals the actual fraction of the population (i.e., (47)).
Then we have:










I(i)g be two districtings
in the set ￿￿ such that
io￿o






o (i))di ￿ ￿D ￿ io￿1







Then there exists a feasible districting in the set ￿.
Proof. Let
￿o = io￿o
















Choose ￿ 2 [0;1] such that
￿￿o + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 = ￿D:
















I(i)g with weight ￿. This districting is in the set ￿ and is feasible. ￿
Thus, if there exist two districtings in the set ￿￿ one of which involves a higher fraction of
Democrats than there are in the population and one a lower fraction, then there must exist a
feasible districting in ￿￿.
Consider now the following pair of optimization problems:




s:t: f(￿D;￿I);(￿D;￿I);￿I(i)g 2 ￿￿;
Pmin
and




s:t: f(￿D;￿I);(￿D;￿I);￿I(i)g 2 ￿￿:
Pmax
34The minimization problem selects the districting in ￿￿ that has the minimal fraction of Democrats,
while the maximization problem selects the districting that has the maximal fraction of Democrats.
Letting the values of these problems be ￿ and ￿ respectively, it follows from Lemma A.1 that
there exists a feasible districting generating fio;io;V ￿
o (i)g if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿. Thus, the
optimal seat-vote curve is implementable if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿.
The Minimization Problem Pmin. To progress further, we need to develop expressions for the
values of the minimization and maximization problems ￿ and ￿. Consider ￿rst the minimization
problem Pmin. To simplify the problem, note that in any solution it is clearly optimal to have no








Similarly, it is optimal to have no Democrats in the safe Republican seats and hence
￿D = 0: (50)
It follows from (50) that we can rewrite (43) as ￿I ￿ ￿
￿+": Similarly, (49) implies that the constraint
that ￿D+￿I ￿ 1 amounts to ￿I ￿ ￿




o (i))di + io[1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿￿"
2￿ )]
s:t: ￿I 2 [0; ￿
￿+"]; ￿I 2 [0; ￿
￿+"]; (46) and (47).
Pmin
In order for this problem to have a solution, it must be the case that the set ￿￿ is non-empty.
Thus, there must exist at least one generating districting which has the property that the average
fraction of Independents equals the actual fraction in the population. A necessary and su￿cient
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The expression on the right hand side is the fraction of Independents associated with the generating
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+ ￿I2￿ ln(1 +
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35We will assume that this inequality is satis￿ed in what follows.
We can now state the value of the minimization problem:
LEMMA A.2. (i) If ￿I 2 [io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"], then







(ii) If ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ )], then


























)] + ￿[io￿I +
Z io
io
￿I(i)di + (1 ￿ io)￿I]
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate constraint (47). Using the de￿nition of the






o (i) ￿ ￿D)
￿I
]di + ￿Iio[￿ ￿ (
￿ ￿ "
2￿
)] + ￿I(1 ￿ io)￿ + constant
We can therefore minimize the Lagrangian pointwise with respect to ￿I(i), ￿I and ￿I, respecting
the inequality constraints on these variables. The value of the multiplier ￿ must be such that (47)
is satis￿ed.
From the fact that V ￿










￿ 0 for all i 2 [io;io]:
It follows that ￿ ￿ ￿+"
2￿ , for if this were not the case, then the solution involves ￿I(i) = 0 for all i,
￿I = 0 and ￿I = 0. This means that constraint (47) cannot be satis￿ed. In addition, note that if
the multiplier lies in the interval 0 to ￿￿"
2￿ this generates no more potential solutions than values
of the multiplier equal to 0. Thus, we can restrict attention to three possibilities: (i) ￿ = 0; (ii)
￿ = ￿￿"
2￿ ; and (iii) ￿ 2 (￿￿"
2￿ ; ￿+"
2￿ ).
Case 1. ￿ = 0
In this case, the solution involves setting the fraction of Independents in the safe Democrat





o (i)) if i 2 [io;b io)
￿I
2(V ￿
o (i)￿￿D) if i 2 [b io;io]
:
36The fraction of Independents in the safe Republican seats does not a￿ect the value of the La-
grangian and hence can be set equal to any level x 2 [0; ￿





+ ￿I2￿ ln(1 +
"
￿
) + (1 ￿ io)x = ￿I:
Thus, for this to be a solution, it must be that ￿I 2 [io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 +
"
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"]:
Case 2. ￿ = ￿￿"
2￿
In this case, the solution involves setting the fractions of Independents in the competitive seats




o (i)) if i 2 [io;b io)
￿I
2(V ￿
o (i)￿￿D) if i 2 [b io;io]
and the fraction of Independents in the safe Republican seats equal to zero so that ￿I = 0. The
fraction of Independents in the safe Democrat seats does not e￿ect the value of the Lagrangian
and hence can be set equal to any level x 2 [0; ￿









Thus, for this to be a solution, it must be that ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ )]:
Case 3. ￿ 2 (￿￿"
2￿ ; ￿+"
2￿ )
It can be shown that if the multiplier is in this range, it must be that ￿I < ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ),
which is not possible.
We conclude that: (i) If ￿I 2 [io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"],
then we are in Case 1 and the solution to the minimization problem is
￿I(i) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
￿
￿+" if i 2 [0;io)
￿I
2(￿I+￿D￿V ￿
o (i)) if i 2 [io;b io)
￿I
2(V ￿





1￿io if i 2 (io;1]
:
(ii) If ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "




> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
￿I￿[￿I2￿ ln(1+ "
￿ )]
io if i 2 [0;io)
￿I
2(￿I+￿D￿V ￿
o (i)) if i 2 [io;b io)
￿I
2(V ￿
o (i)￿￿D) if i 2 [b io;io]
0 if i 2 (io;1]
:
We can now prove the Lemma by deriving the corresponding allocation of Democrats across
districts and computing the aggregate fraction of Democrats used. For example, in case (i),
equations (49), (50), and the fact that ￿D(i) = f(￿I(i);V ￿
o (i)) for all i 2 [io;io], imply that
￿D(i) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
"





o (i) if i 2 [io;b io)
0 if i 2 [b io;io]
0 if i 2 (io;1]
:








o (i) )di + io
"
￿+"
= ￿I" ￿ ￿I￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + io
"
￿+":
This completes the proof of Lemma A.1. ￿
The Maximization Problem Pmax. Turning to the maximization problem, we have that:
LEMMA A.3. (i) If ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+";io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"],
then
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿I" + ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿




(ii) If ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"], then
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿I" + ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿











Proof. Following the same steps as used in the proof of Lemma A.2, it may be shown that: (i) if
￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+";io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"], then
￿ = ￿I" ￿ ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿
) + io[1 ￿ (
￿I ￿ [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
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￿ ) + (1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"], then
￿ = ￿I" ￿ ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿











Using the de￿nitions of io and io in (39) and (40) and with a little work, these expressions can be
shown to equal the claimed expressions in the statement of the Lemma. ￿
Completing the Proof. We will now show that the optimal inverse seat-vote curve fio;io;V ￿
o (￿)g
satis￿es the constraint that ￿ ￿ ￿D if and only if (12) holds for ￿D and the constraint that ￿ ￿ ￿D
if and only if (12) holds for ￿R. We begin with the former.
From Lemma A.1 we know that: (i) if ￿I 2 [io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ ) +
(1 ￿ io) ￿
￿+"], then







and (ii) if ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ );io
￿
￿+" + ￿I2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ )], then














In addition, observe that after substituting in for io, we have that ￿I ￿ io
￿






￿ )[1 ￿ 2￿ ln(1 + "
￿ )] + " ￿ 1
2
; (52)
so that case (i) arises if (52) holds and case (ii) otherwise.
Suppose that (52) holds so that case (i) arises. Then, after substituting in for io, we have that





















which is just (12).


































39To summarize, if (52) holds the constraint ￿ ￿ ￿D will be satis￿ed if and only if (12) is satis￿ed.
If (52) does not hold the constraint that ￿ ￿ ￿D will be satis￿ed if and only if (53) is satis￿ed.
We can now prove that ￿ ￿ ￿D if and only if (12) holds for ￿D. Suppose ￿rst that (12) is not




+ " ￿ (￿ + ")ln(1 +
"
￿
)) < (1 +
"
￿
)(1 ￿ 2￿ ln(1 +
"
￿




It follows that the constraint ￿ ￿ ￿D will be violated. Next suppose that (12) is satis￿ed. Then



















This amounts to 1 ￿ 2"ln(1+ "
￿ ), which holds under our assumptions on " and ￿. It follows that,
irrespective of whether (52) holds, the constraint ￿ ￿ ￿D will be satis￿ed.
It only remains to show that ￿ ￿ ￿D if and only if (12) holds for ￿R. From Lemma A.2, we






￿ +￿I2￿ ln(1+ "
￿ )+ 1￿io
1+ "
￿ ] then ￿ ￿ ￿D if and only
if
1 ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿I" + ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿




which is equivalent to
￿R ￿ ￿I" ￿ ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿




Similarly, (ii) if ￿I 2 [￿I2￿ ln(1 + "




￿ ], then ￿ ￿ ￿D if and only if
1 ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿I" + ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿











which is equivalent to
￿R ￿ ￿I" ￿ ￿I￿ ln(1 +
"
￿











Observing that 1 ￿ io = ￿R + ￿I
2 ￿ ￿I", we can simply apply the argument from the ￿rst part of
the proof with ￿R replacing ￿D to reach the desired conclusion. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Using the de￿nitions from the proof of Proposition 2, the optimal seat-
vote curve is implementable with a districting of the form in (16) if and only if (a) the proposed
districting is a feasible districting and (b) ￿D + 1=2 ￿ ￿D ￿ V and ￿D + 1=2 ￿ ￿D ￿ V .
40The proposed districting is a feasible districting if and only if the following conditions are





















]di + (1 ￿ io)￿D = ￿D: (54)
It is straightforward to show that condition (a.iii) is satis￿ed if and only if ￿I ￿ ￿
￿+". Condition













]di = ￿I"(1 ￿ ￿I);
so that (54) can be rewritten as
io￿D + ￿I"(1 ￿ ￿I) + (1 ￿ io)￿D = ￿D: (55)
Using the de￿nitions of V and V , the inequality requirements in (b) can be rewritten as ￿D ￿
1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿￿"
2￿ ) and ￿D ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿+"
2￿ ).
Combining all this, the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable with a districting of the form
in (16) if and only if there exist ￿D 2 [1
2 ￿￿I(￿￿"
2￿ );1￿￿I] and ￿D 2 [0; 1
2 ￿￿I(￿+"
2￿ )] that satisfy
(55). Solving (55), we have that
￿D =
￿D ￿ ￿I"(1 ￿ ￿I) ￿ io￿D
1 ￿ io
:
So de￿ning the function:
g(￿D) =
￿D ￿ ￿I"(1 ￿ ￿I) ￿ io￿D
1 ￿ io
;
the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable with a districting of the form in (16) if and only if
there exists ￿D 2 [1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿￿"
2￿ );1 ￿ ￿I] such that g(￿D) 2 [0; 1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿+"
2￿ )].
Since g is decreasing, it follows that if g(1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿￿"
2￿ )) ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿+"
2￿ ) the condition is met if
and only if g(1
2 ￿￿I(￿￿"
2￿ )) ￿ 0, while if g(1
2 ￿￿I(￿￿"
2￿ )) > 1
2 ￿￿I(￿+"
2￿ ) the condition is met if and
only if g(1 ￿ ￿I) ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿+"














2￿ )) ￿ 1
2 ￿ ￿I(￿+"
2￿ ) if and only if ￿D ￿ ￿R. Thus, if ￿D ￿ ￿R the condition is
met if and only if g(1
2￿￿I(￿￿"
2￿ )) ￿ 0 and if ￿D > ￿R it is met if and only if g(1￿￿I) ￿ 1
2￿￿I(￿+"
2￿ ):
41So suppose that ￿D ￿ ￿R. Then, the condition is





which is equivalent to (17) holding for ￿D. On the other hand, if ￿D > ￿R, then the condition is
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45FOOTNOTES
1. Important papers in this literature include Butler [1951], Gelman and King [1990] and [1994],
King [1989], King and Browning [1987] and Tufte [1973]. For general discussions of districting see
Galderisi [2005] and Mann and Cain [2005].
2. More generally, a seat-vote curve is said to display partisan symmetry if S(V ) = 1￿S(1￿V )
for all V . A seat-vote curve is then de￿ned to exhibit partisan bias if it deviates from partisan
symmetry systematically in favor of one party.
3. In legal discussions of districting, it is common to advocate implementing plans that satisfy
certain traditional \principles". These include the democratic ideals of respecting political sub-
divisions and recognizing communities of actual shared interest, and spatial criteria concerning
contiguity and compactness. A small literature has emerged analyzing various ways to measure
district compactness. In an interesting new paper, Fryer and Holden [2006] review this literature,
propose a new measure of compactness, and show how to compute the most compact districting.
4. Papers in this tradition include Owen and Grofman [1988], Gilligan and Matsusaka [1999],
Sherstyuk [1998] and Shotts [2001], [2002]. More recently, Friedman and Holden [2006] revisit the
partisan gerrymandering problem, providing an elegant and comprehensive analysis.
5. In an interesting application of the theory, Shotts [2001] and [2002] uses his positive models
of partisan gerrymandering to understand the policy implications of mandating that districting
authorities form so-called majority-minority districts.
6. Their ambitious analysis formalizes the intuition that there maybe a trade-o￿ between
descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation is achieved by having dis-
tricts elect black representatives, while substantive representation is achieved when the legislature
chooses policies that favor black voters. Maximizing descriptive representation may require con-
centrating black voters into majority-minority districts, while maximizing substantive represen-
tation may require a more even spreading of black voters. The underlying structure of Epstein
and O’Hallaran’s model is simpler than the one presented in this paper in that it does not al-
low for Independents and there is no aggregate uncertainty in voters’ preferences. On the other
hand, to incorporate substantive representation, they model strategic policy choices on the part
of politicians, whereas in our model parties’ ideologies are ￿xed.
7. In an interesting paper, Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran [1996] develop a methodology for
46assessing the e￿ect of di￿erent districting schemes on the substantive representation of minority
interests as measured by U.S. House members’ roll-call voting scores on minority issues. This
methodology is then applied to calculate the districting strategy that would maximize substantive
black representation in the U.S. House.
8. As will be seen below, most of our results, with the exception of the measure of welfare
gains, are independent of the exact values of the parameters ￿ and ￿.
9. This objective function is equivalent to aggregate expected utility under the assumption
that each Independent voter is ex ante identical. Under this assumption, for a given draw of m,
each Independent is equally likely to have any ideology on [m￿￿;m+￿]. The expected payo￿ of
any Independent voter is then just the payo￿ of the average Independent voter.
10. For example, suppose that the aggregate vote for Democrats increases from 30% to 40%
and suppose their initial seat share is 30%. Then whether their seat share increases to 35% or 45%
has no impact on policy because in either situation the median legislator remains a Republican.
Thus, the responsiveness of the seat-vote curve over this part of the domain is irrelevant.
11. Recent empirical evidence is consistent with this no commitment assumption. In particu-
lar, Lee, Moretti, and Butler [2004] ￿nd that exogenous changes in electoral support for one party
does not induce changes in campaign platforms, as measured in post-election roll call voting data.
12. As noted in the introduction, Besley and Preston [2006] study how districting impacts
the platform choices of competing political parties in a model with a very similar ￿avor to ours.
Their work could be a starting place for analyzing the problem of optimal districting taking into
account its impact on parties’ strategic choices.
13. As noted in the introduction, Gilligan and Matsusaka [2005] study the optimal districting
problem from this Downsian perspective under the assumption that the objective function is to
minimize the distance between the ideology of the median legislator and the median voter. Their
main ￿nding is that identical districts are optimal. With identical districts, each candidate adopts
the position of the population median voter and all candidates have a homogeneous (and optimal)
ideology.
14. When " = 0, the fraction of Independents supporting the Democrats is certain and the
seat-vote curve is degenerate.
15. That said, it would certainly be interesting to extend the analysis here to the case in
which the districting authority only observes a signal of each voter’s ideology (as in Friedman and
47Holden [2006]).
16. As noted in Section II.D, the linearity of the optimal seat-vote curve follows from our
assumptions that citizens have quadratic loss functions and that the distribution of Independents’
ideologies is uniform across its support. In Coate and Knight [2005] we explore the implications
of more general assumptions for the optimal seat-vote curve. We show that the factors identi￿ed
in the basic model (i.e., (￿D ￿ ￿R) and 2￿) remain key determinants of its partisan bias and
responsiveness. Interestingly, we have also found in simulations that the optimal seat-vote curve
is ￿atter when the citizens’ loss function is more convex. This suggests the idea that optimal
responsiveness is inversely related to \political risk aversion".
17. In this case, the optimal seat-vote curve is So(V ) = 1=2 + 2￿(V ￿ 1=2), while the only
feasible seat-vote curve is S(V ) = 0 if V < 1=2 and S(V ) = 1 if V > 1=2.
18. It is easy to see how. When " = 0 exactly 1=2 of the Independents will vote Democrat
and 1=2 will vote Republican. The optimal seat share for the Democrats is ￿D +￿I=2. Consider a
districting that grouped all the Democrats together, all Independents together and all Republicans
together. This would generate ￿D +￿I=2 Democratic seats if the ties in the Independent districts
were resolved by the toss of a fair coin. The problem of ties can be avoided by transferring a small
number of Democrats into 1=2 the Independent districts and a small number of Republicans into
the other half.
19. It may also be noted that the safe Democrat and safe Republican seats are identical.
However, this is inconsequential. All that matters is that these seats be safe. The seat-vote curve
is una￿ected by the exact margin of victory in these seats.
20. Indeed, Shotts [2002] argues that geographic constraints necessitate that each district
contain at least some minimum fraction of each type of voter.
21. That is, EW￿(S(V )) =
R V
V W(S(V );m(V )) dV
V ￿V :
22. In the empirical application to follow, we estimate the moments by running panel data
regressions that relate district voting returns to voter characteristics. Data on the statewide
fraction of Independents is taken from survey data.
23. Intuitively, large swings in the Democratic vote share within a state could be due to a large
fraction of Independents (￿I), large swings in the preferences of the median Independent ("), or a
tight distribution of ideology among Independents (￿), in which case relatively small swings in the
preferences of the median Independent translate into relatively large swings in voting outcomes.
4824. We prefer this setting over the U.S. House because, in federal redistricting, state o￿cials
control the redistricting process and each redistricting plan thus only partially contributes to
the resulting allocation of national seats across parties in Congress. Redistricting plans for state
legislatures are also controlled by state o￿cials, and redistricting plans thus perfectly correspond
to changes in seats in state legislatures.
25. Some states elect multiple members from each district to state legislatures.
26. States deviating from this pattern of elections include Virginia, which has elections in
odd years and adopted redistricting plans in 1991 and 2001, and Colorado, whose district lines
were redrawn in 1998 following litigation over the representation of minority groups in the state
legislature.
27. These data, which are published in Barone et al [1998], include the fraction of residents
living in urban areas, the fraction living in suburban areas, household income, percent of residents
with a college degree, percent over age 65, percent African-American, and percent Hispanic.
28. These data were downloaded from the website http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603 pct.zip.
In order to compute the time-invariant fraction of Independents for each State, we take averages
across the years listed in Table 1. We choose this data source over others, such as the National
Election Survey, due to the large sample size, an important consideration when computing state-
speci￿c statistics. During the 1992-2000 period as a whole, these surveys included over 200,000
respondents nationally.
29. Our dataset consists of 2,973 state legislative districts, of which 2,703 had at least one
contested election during the relevant time period.
30. This bootstrap approach also corrects for the additional uncertainty associated with the
second step regression including a generated variable on the left-hand side.
31. Alternatively, one could report the mean of the parameters across replications. These
estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 2 and are available from the authors upon
request.
32. An alternative solution to this problem would be to simply \shut down" this unobserved
component and use only the observed component as our estimate of the moments. This is, after all,
the central tendency (the mean and median) of the distribution of moments. The di￿culty with
this approach, however, is that it will tend to understate the degree of cross-district heterogeneity,
which in turn may tend to overstate the responsiveness of the seat-vote curve. To see this,
49consider the extreme case in which the true moments are heterogeneous across districts but in
which the observed voter characteristics have no explanatory power in the regressions. Then, if
the unobserved component is shut down, the estimated seat-vote curve will be that associated
with identical districting and will thus jump from 0 to 1 at V=1/2, and all districts will thus be
considered competitive. Of course, our voter characteristics do have explanatory power but the
more general lesson still holds: ignoring the unobserved component tends to understate the degree
of heterogeneity across districts.
33. This simulation approach is similar to methods used in Gelman and King [1990], [1994].
In Gelman and King [1994], for example, votes (Vi) are assumed to be related to observable
candidate characteristics (Xi), such as incumbency, and the authors estimate the parameters of
the regression equation Vi = Xi￿ + ui, where ui is unobserved and normally distributed; i.e.
ui ￿ N(0;￿2). Importantly, the variance is assumed to be constant across districts. With the
estimated parameters in hand, the authors then simulate the model, and the implied seat-vote
curve, by drawing from the distribution of district-speci￿c votes for the Democrat (i.e., the ui’s).
This similarity not withstanding, there are three key di￿erences between our approach and that of
Gelman and King. First, as noted in the introduction, we begin with a theoretical model and focus
on providing micro foundations for the measurement of seat-vote curves. Second, their approach
assumes that this variance of the vote generating process is constant across districts; in the context
of our model, this assumption would require that all districts have an equal fraction of Independent
voters, and we thus allow this variance to be heterogeneous across districts. Third, in explaining
di￿erences in voting patterns across districts, Gelman and King [1994] rely on observable candidate
characteristics whereas, given our theoretical assumption of homogeneous candidates, we rely on
observable voter characteristics.
34. This responsiveness measure is obtained by computing the slope of the linear seat-vote
curve that best approximates the estimated seat-vote curve. To be more precise, de￿ne the lin-
earized estimated seat-vote curve to be Sl(V ) = 1=2 + b + r(V ￿ 1=2), where b and r are chosen
in order to minimize the expected square distance between the estimated and the linearized esti-
mated seat-vote curves. That is: r =cov[V;S(V )]=var(V ) and b = E[S(V )]￿1=2￿r[E(V )￿1=2].
Then our measure of responsiveness is r.
35. Note that in evaluating the conditions for implementation, we have not used external
information on the statewide fraction of Democrats and Republican. It is comforting to note,
50however, that the implied fraction of partisans from voting behavior are highly correlated with
the fraction of voters self-reporting as partisans. Using the fact that the implied statewide fraction
of Democrats and Republicans are given by ￿D = ￿ ￿ ￿I=2 and ￿R = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿I=2; we calculate
the cross-replication correlation between the implied and reported fraction of voters to be roughly
0.8 for both Republicans and Democrats.
36. While a welfare comparison of the continuous optimal seat-vote curve and the discrete
measured seat-vote curve is somewhat arti￿cial, we use the continuous optimal seat-vote curve in
order to apply the implementability condition from Proposition 2. To provide a sense of the error
associated with this approximation, we have derived a discrete optimal seat-vote curve, which is
a step-function approximation of the continuous optimal seat-vote curve. Welfare associated with
this discrete optimal seat-vote curve is similar to welfare under the continuous optimal seat-vote
curve, and the approximation error associated with the use of a continuous optimal seat-vote
curve is thus small in practice. The small size of this error should not be surprising given that the
discrete and continuous optimal seat-vote curve converge as the number of districts grows large.
As shown in Table 1, states tend have a large number of legislative districts.
37. Of course, if this surplus is itself very large, then these gains could be quite large in
monetary terms. But without further assumptions on the underlying welfare parameters ￿ and ￿,
these percentage gains in welfare cannot be converted into monetary terms.
38. Note that the seat-vote curve generated by identical districting equals 0 for V < 1=2 and
1 for V ￿ 1=2: In the context of our model, this is also the seat-vote curve generated by at-large
voting systems, providing an additional motivation for this benchmark.
39. The reader may be concerned that our assumption that optimal responsiveness is at its
upper bound may contribute in part to these small welfare gains associated with a movement
from PR to optimal districting. Indeed, as the diversity parameter ￿ approaches 1=2, the optimal
seat-vote curve converges to the PR seat-vote curve, as can be seen in equation (11). So there
would obviously be no welfare gains to socially optimal districting in this case. To examine the
role of this upper bound assumption, we experimented with alternative values of the parameter ￿.
For example, when ￿ = 0:25, optimal responsiveness equals 0:25=(1+￿) and is thus less than 1/4;
even in this case, however, the welfare gains associated with a movement from PR to the optimal
seat-vote curve are small, averaging 0.18% across states and replications. Thus, these results
are robust to alternative parameter values and are not driven by the assumption that optimal
51responsiveness is at its upper bound.
52state first redistricting subsequent redistricting number districts
AL 1994 2002 105
CA 1992 2002 80
CO 1992 1998 65
CT 1992 2002 151
DE 1992 2002 41
FL 1994 2002 120
IA 1992 2002 100
IL 1992 2002 118
KS 1992 2002 125
KY 1996 2002 100
ME 1994 2002 151
MI 1992 2002 110
MO 1992 2002 163
MS 1995 2002 122
MT 1994 2002 100
NM 1992 2002 70
NV 1992 2002 42
NY 1992 2002 150
OH 1992 2002 99
OK 1992 2002 101
OR 1992 2002 60
PA 1992 2002 203
RI 1992 2002 100
SC 1992 1998 124
TN 1994 2002 99
UT 1992 2002 75
VA 1991 2001 100
WI 1992 2002 99
Table I: States and Years Included in AnalysisMoment mean variance
percent urban 0.0694** -0.0570
(0.0078) (0.0947)
percent suburban 0.0357** -0.1332
(0.0083) (0.1011)
household income (thousands) -0.0035** -0.0120**
(0.0004) (0.0040)
percent with college degree 0.1438** -0.2667
(0.0388) (0.4534)
percent over age 65 0.3649** 0.0648
(0.0364) (0.5930)
percent African American 0.4779** -2.7374**
(0.0144) (0.2649)
percent Hispanic 0.2926** -0.1256
(0.0320) (0.3273)
R-squared 0.4386 0.0494
Number of districts 2707 2707
Number of elections 8504 8504
Table II: Random Effects Regression Results
(all regressions include state-specific constant terms, bootstrap standard errors in parentheses)state r optimal r difference b optimal b difference expected seats difference
AL 2.7483 0.7044 2.0439 0.0480
CA 2.4170 0.6212 1.7958 -0.0125 0.0162 -0.0287 0.0826
CO 2.6867 0.7277 1.9589 0.0846 -0.0038 0.0884 0.0480
CT 2.1870 0.6155 1.5716 -0.0298 0.0146 -0.0444 0.0183
DE 2.2597 0.6354 1.6243 -0.0610 -0.0158 -0.0452 -0.0951
FL 3.0914 0.6791 2.4123 0.0250 -0.0080 0.0330 -0.0332
IA 3.3310 0.7288 2.6022 -0.0200 -0.0041 -0.0159 -0.0457
IL 2.3693 0.6658 1.7035 -0.0508 0.0157 -0.0665 0.0364
KS 2.7312 0.6033 2.1279 -0.0360 -0.0106 -0.0254 -0.0627
KY 3.5330 0.6289 2.9041 -0.0500 0.0075 -0.0575 0.0314
ME 3.1589 0.7003 2.4587 0.0033 0.0067 -0.0034 0.0361
MI 3.1192 0.7416 2.3776 -0.1000 0.0010 -0.1010 -0.0086
MO 3.0136 0.6960 2.3176 -0.0521 0.0093 -0.0615 0.0160
MS 2.6200 0.6771 1.9429 0.1156
MT 2.8717 0.6763 2.1954 0.0000 -0.0170 0.0170 -0.0922
NM 3.3887 0.7038 2.6849 -0.0286 0.0090 -0.0376 0.0525
NV 3.1484 0.6965 2.4519 0.0238 0.0042 0.0196 0.0697
NY 2.3173 0.6900 1.6272 0.0812
OH 2.5471 0.6413 1.9058 -0.0657 0.0005 -0.0662 -0.0424
OK 3.2740 0.5186 2.7554 -0.0347 0.0063 -0.0410 0.0000
OR 2.7487 0.6145 2.1342 0.0000 -0.0101 0.0101 -0.0313
PA 2.6887 0.5803 2.1084 -0.0172 0.0139 -0.0311 0.0242
RI 1.9708 0.7432 1.2276 0.1757
SC 2.3915 0.6985 1.6930 -0.0726 0.0057 -0.0783 -0.0277
TN 2.9736 0.7059 2.2677 -0.1061 0.0165 -0.1225 0.0078
UT 2.6488 0.7316 1.9172 -0.0333 -0.0182 -0.0151 -0.1501
VA 2.1373 0.6678 1.4695 -0.0200 -0.0052 -0.0148 -0.0442
WI 2.8097 0.7094 2.1003 -0.0657 -0.0049 -0.0608 -0.0587
Average 2.7565 0.6715 2.0850 -0.0300 0.0012 -0.0312 0.0054
Table III: Properties of Estimated and Optimal Seat-Vote Curves
(for replication associated with median welfare loss by state)mean median mean median mean median
AL 1.8239 1.8652 1.0131 , 2.4326 -0.0804 -0.0812 -0.1421 , -0.0379 0.0541 0.0487 0.0108 , 0.1202
CA 1.8327 1.8481 1.0972 , 2.4980 -0.0283 -0.0271 -0.0798 , 0.0329 0.0792 0.0838 -0.0001 , 0.1356
CO 1.8700 1.8641 1.1077 , 2.7489 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0724 , 0.0542 -0.0560 -0.0549 -0.1323 , 0.0170
CT 1.7339 1.7479 1.4181 , 2.0376 -0.0577 -0.0555 -0.1023 , -0.0244 0.0265 0.0258 -0.0064 , 0.0551
DE 2.0212 2.0231 1.2378 , 2.8136 -0.0427 -0.0416 -0.1273 , 0.0361 -0.0584 -0.0543 -0.1365 , 0.0248
FL 2.0488 2.0093 1.5851 , 2.6673 -0.0306 -0.0283 -0.0840 , 0.0206 -0.0239 -0.0263 -0.0767 , 0.0361
IA 2.3761 2.3970 1.8240 , 2.9774 -0.0014 -0.0048 -0.0550 , 0.0487 -0.0134 -0.0145 -0.0628 , 0.0418
IL 1.7695 1.8173 1.2300 , 2.2815 -0.0878 -0.0865 -0.1295 , -0.0507 0.0105 0.0104 -0.0297 , 0.0455
KS 2.0040 1.9937 1.5830 , 2.5635 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0494 , 0.0427 -0.0857 -0.0833 -0.1269 , -0.0445
KY 2.5209 2.5256 1.7970 , 3.2608 -0.0490 -0.0508 -0.0999 , 0.0033 0.0496 0.0487 -0.0038 , 0.1140
ME 2.3666 2.3653 2.0194 , 2.6793 -0.0061 -0.0035 -0.0442 , 0.0429 0.0435 0.0473 -0.0008 , 0.0830
MI 2.0319 2.0469 1.3785 , 2.6249 -0.0951 -0.0973 -0.1413 , -0.0515 -0.0233 -0.0265 -0.0771 , 0.0313
MO 2.1379 2.1538 1.7466 , 2.6283 -0.0767 -0.0783 -0.1163 , -0.0378 0.0138 0.0158 -0.0215 , 0.0500
MS 1.6717 1.7072 1.0177 , 2.3327 -0.0241 -0.0241 -0.0440 -0.0043 0.1135 0.1118 0.0630 , 0.1655
MT 2.2381 2.2022 1.6500 , 3.1036 0.0124 0.0115 -0.0414 , 0.0649 -0.1023 -0.1017 -0.1568 , -0.0490
NM 1.9778 1.9869 1.1543 , 2.7721 -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0704 , 0.0580 0.0743 0.0721 0.0020 , 0.1387
NV 2.1884 2.1779 1.3243 , 3.0263 -0.0291 -0.0303 -0.1053 , 0.0475 0.0434 0.0419 -0.0399 , 0.1231
NY 1.5752 1.5660 1.1122 , 2.0576 0.0851 0.0849 0.0529 , 0.1128
OH 2.0223 1.9576 1.5078 , 2.5498 -0.0551 -0.0557 -0.1058 , -0.0125 -0.0353 -0.0330 -0.0839 , 0.0135
OK 2.4721 2.4915 1.9608 , 3.0119 -0.0375 -0.0386 -0.0878 , 0.0111 0.0388 0.0412 -0.0164 , 0.0923
OR 2.3696 2.2990 1.6972 , 3.0857 -0.0080 -0.0132 -0.0700 , 0.0628 -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0804 , 0.0821
PA 2.1454 2.1410 1.7926 , 2.5518 -0.0649 -0.0655 -0.1012 , -0.0226 -0.0143 -0.0145 -0.0566 , 0.0283
RI 1.2585 1.2690 0.6227 , 1.8859 0.1712 0.1735 0.1336 , 0.2144
SC 1.8004 1.7805 1.1822 , 2.3830 -0.0310 -0.0283 -0.0763 , 0.0135 -0.0060 -0.0035 -0.0583 , 0.0416
TN 2.0311 2.0160 1.5091 , 2.6308 -0.0775 -0.0800 -0.1260 , -0.0171 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0591 , 0.0550
UT 1.8290 1.7967 1.0440 , 2.6165 0.0202 0.0191 -0.0300 , 0.0758 -0.1496 -0.1517 -0.2136 , -0.0717
VA 1.7549 1.7406 1.2524 , 2.2849 -0.0345 -0.0339 -0.0769 , 0.0117 -0.0095 -0.0116 -0.0534 , 0.0466
WI 2.2543 2.2377 1.7681 , 2.7728 -0.0385 -0.0415 -0.0811 , 0.0075 -0.0220 -0.0264 -0.0812 , 0.0464
Average 2.0045 2.0010 -0.0359 -0.0363 0.0072 0.0071
confidence interval
difference in responsiveness
Table IV: Properties of Estimated and Optimal Seat-Vote Curves
(properties of distribution across all replications)
difference in bias
confidence interval
difference in expected seats
confidence intervalstate % independents average maximum % independents Pr(implementable)
AL 29.44% 70.77% 100%
CA 26.01% 73.13% 100%
CO 39.12% 80.16% 100%
CT 41.89% 67.34% 100%
DE 36.20% 76.83% 100%
FL 27.59% 82.25% 100%
IA 40.46% 80.60% 100%
IL 33.64% 72.11% 100%
KS 31.18% 73.56% 100%
KY 22.55% 79.14% 100%
ME 45.71% 75.60% 100%
MI 35.16% 80.19% 100%
MO 37.15% 74.65% 100%
MS 24.94% 63.52% 100%
MT 36.36% 75.27% 100%
NM 29.43% 78.03% 100%
NV 29.78% 77.84% 100%
NY 30.92% 60.60% 100%
OH 32.41% 80.25% 100%
OK 18.79% 75.86% 100%
OR 30.99% 78.82% 100%
PA 24.59% 78.58% 100%
RI 51.19% 58.14% 100%
SC 33.02% 83.00% 100%
TN 33.94% 77.89% 100%
UT 33.91% 70.49% 100%
VA 34.42% 80.60% 100%
WI 36.43% 81.68% 100%
Table V: Conditions for Implementabilitystate median % welfare gains average % welfare gains
AL 0.99% 1.11% 0.36% , 2.27%
CA 1.74% 1.86% 0.72% , 3.54%
CO 1.21% 1.45% 0.45% , 3.08%
CT 1.80% 1.82% 1.19% , 2.53%
DE 2.38% 2.43% 0.77% , 4.14%
FL 1.20% 1.24% 0.68% , 2.02%
IA 1.87% 1.90% 1.04% , 2.99%
IL 1.04% 1.06% 0.47% , 1.74%
KS 2.52% 2.50% 1.53% , 3.60%
KY 1.76% 1.76% 0.82% , 3.08%
ME 2.52% 2.62% 1.84% , 3.72%
MI 0.91% 0.94% 0.50% , 1.52%
MO 1.51% 1.50% 0.92% , 2.11%
MS 2.26% 2.34% 1.08% , 4.06%
MT 2.62% 2.75% 1.32% , 4.47%
NM 1.53% 1.73% 0.57% , 3.23%
NV 1.74% 1.82% 0.70% , 3.45%
NY 1.37% 1.41% 0.76% , 2.15%
OH 1.49% 1.60% 0.90% , 2.57%
OK 2.55% 2.54% 1.53% , 3.64%
OR 2.00% 2.22% 1.10% , 3.96%
PA 1.57% 1.61% 1.04% , 2.31%
RI 4.21% 4.15% 2.67% , 6.02%
SC 0.78% 0.84% 0.40% , 1.47%
TN 1.10% 1.15% 0.55% , 1.89%
UT 3.56% 3.78% 1.98% , 6.20%
VA 0.93% 1.01% 0.45% , 1.82%
WI 1.50% 1.55% 0.83% , 2.54%
Average 1.81% 1.88%
confidence interval
Table VI: Welfare Gains to Optimal Districtingη =1 η =0.75 η =0.50 η =0.25
γ/β =1 1.88% 2.06% 2.25% 2.46%
γ/β =0.75 1.33% 1.46% 1.59% 1.74%
γ/β =0.50 0.84% 0.92% 1.01% 1.10%
γ/β =0.25 0.40% 0.44% 0.48% 0.52%
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Graphs by state